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INTRODUCTION
For as long as men have made war upon each other they
have sought to torm alliances tor peace.

To be sure, the

principles that were enunciated in past centuries Blight not be
found very sophisticated or cOllplex in this ace of co.plicated
and changing political syste.s. l Tbose early alliances were
hardly organiaations, and the peace they strove _tor was to be
2
achieved by conquest.
Still, all the while men have sOllehow
retained the notion that recourse to war is not necessarily
inevitable, nor an inextricable part of lIan's nature.
Since lien grouped thellselves into nations, and the
fighting unit expanded froll the singular to the plural, other
.en have put their lIinds to devising sOlie forll of association
whicb would abolish physical strength as the determining factor
in bUlian relations.

Physical strengtb in this context is to be

I For example, the ~pbictyonic Council of Greece, whicb
was religious in cbaracter, and the political philosopby ot
Plato, which held that hOllogeneity of stock ought to preclude
warrare. Republic, Book V, p. 472.
2John Sylvester He.leben, Plans for World Peace througb
Six Centuries. (Chicago, 1943), pp. xl-xlI.
I

2

understood as comprising tbe .achine. .en operate as an extension ot their own prowess.
As aen tormed more precise and detinable political

unit~

more precise plans emerged to bring order to the chaos of a
~orld

ruled by the mighty.

~eret

by itself, overwhelmingly powertul and so could establish

~D

Of course, if an individual natioD

etfect one world girdling natioD, the problem would disappear.

fhere might, to be sure, arise then probl.m. ot civil wars and
revolutioDS, but tbat is Dot our concern bere.
~elves

~s

We addr.ss our-

to the question of keeping peace saong natioDs since it

these ot which the world 1. made.
state.anship bas grown .s complex as tbe world to

rhicb it attempts to bring order.
~eed

to find causal linea running trom thought to deed and

rice versa.
~ather

~he
~o

MOre than ever there is •

This is not to satisfy som. logician'. 8ch.ma, but

to provide an ever clearer and more detailed picture ot

factors which motivate the response ot a particular nation
a given international situation.
One op6rate& inevitably within the context of one's own

ociety.

The greater part of our thought i. conditioned by a
hou.and years of orientation to ance.tral behavior. 3 When the
3 Tbi• i. not an attempt to establish tbe philosophy ot
race rememberance" as an operating principle or even to identity
be above statement as within tbe same context. It is merely an
expression of the conservative nature ot man in society.

3

tera "Thousand Year Reicb" was cbosen to describe the regime of
Hitler, it was meant to presage its endurance into tbe future.
What it pointed to, in reality, was the preceding lIilleniUII
whicb provided the solI out of which grew tbe Third Reicb. 4
War,

a8

it was studied in lIedieval t1aes, had a derin1te

place in the lives of peOI)les.

Grotlus, the father of inter-

national law, devoted the major portion of his work to deteraining when a war was "just. a5 Until recent tilles war itself was
never questioned, only the conduct thereof.

Twentieth century

apologists tor war concede that the hUManization of war is all
right, but insist that war is a part of nature, that it purifies and is necessary.6

"But it is quite anotber matter it tbe

object is to abolish war entirely and to deny its necessary
4see: The Politics ot Cultural Despair by Fritz stern.
weber discusses the torce of the "idea" in deteraining the
behavior of Nations in the political arena in bis book, The
Tbeory of Social and Econoaie Organization, (New York: nxlord,
Max

1§47J,

p.

a§9.

.

5Grotius' best known work i81
written in 1625.

De

jure belli ao pacis,

'General Friedricb von Bernhardi wrote, aWe are acoustOIled to recard war as a curse, and refus. to recognize it as
tbe createst factor in the furtherance of culture and power."
GeJ'llaDI and the Next WK, (New York: Chas. A. Eroll, 1914) p. 11.
aeneral Bans von Seeokt was viol~tly opposed to the
League, to arbitration, or to any form of forswearing war a.
co.pletely unnatural.
Schiller wrote "Ode to Peace" tor Beethoven's Nintb
Syapbony but in "Braut von Messina" be aigO wrote the line:
"War enables all that is mean."

I

..
place in historical development."?
This aspiration (tor peace) is directly antagonistic to the great universal laws whieh
rule all lite. War is a biological necessity
of the first i.portance, a regulative ele.ent
in the life of mankind which cannot be dispensed
with, since without it an unhealthy development will tollow, whicb exclude. every advancement of the race, and therefore all real
8
civilization. "War is the tather ot all things."
The sages of antiquity long before Darwin recognized tbis. 9
Wbat this line ot reasoning tails to comprehend is the
tact that war, since the advent of .aebines, is no longer
natural.

Thus there cannot be any biological necessity; maD

will not improve his speed a. a runner nor that ot his progeny
by driving in fast motorcars.
nothing.

Biologically he haa aChieved

To speak of biological development and purification

through war is completely false for the s8lle reason.

It is

not necessarily the strong and brave who survive a war.

Indeed,
it eould be argued that it is they who are the first to d1e. lO
'Friedrich von Bernhardt, Germani and the Next War
(Ne. York: Charles A. Eron. 1914). p. 1 .
8See :

Claus Wagner's work "Der Krieg als Schaflendes

W.ltprinzip~"

98ernhardi, 02. cit. p. 18.
10MWar spares not the ~rav. but the cowardly.- AnacreoDI
The Greek Anthology, book 7, epigram 160. Tranalated by J. M.
Edmonds.

5

It would be better, in arguing this point, to approach it
categorically, establishing the dichotomy between the Darwtnian
tbeory and the concept that war (as men wage it) is a necessary
part of that theory.

The degree of technology to wbich weapona

had advanced would be a nonessential for such consideratioa.
But for present purpose. it is sufficient to work with tbe
added light of the twentieth century.ll
War in the t*entietb century bas shown that there i8 no
longer any such question to be asked.

But it was a nineteentb-

century Germany whicbpreeipitated the Great War.
tbis same

Ge~an1

And it was

which petitioned for and gained entry into

the League of Nations.

Great and influential .inds spoke of

international organizations

peace before and 8ince King
George ot Bobeaia enunciated his grand sCheae. 12 But wbat
to~

were these ideas against schoolbooks wbich, 1t they mentioned
sucb concepts at alIt placed them in the towers to which tbey
consigned those who believed in tbe.?

Mld

wbat were tbey

IIDarwin cautioned against just such misuse ot his
theories when he produced his work on the survival of tbe
fittest.

12~oog othersl Dant., Grotius. Rousseau, and Kant.
George of Podebrad, king of Bobe.ia io the filteeoth century,
outlined a plan of peace wbich was the precursor of all subsequent schemes to avoid war aa the relationship between
- sovereign entities. The document itself 1s significant in that
it demonstrates a long history in man's efforts to organize
for peace.

6

acaln.t the overwbelaing. alaost priaordial. dlctua that war i.
an ennobling experience?

That idea bad tw. side. to It.

For

indeed. it was only in war that all tbe aan1y virtue. could be
exerci••d and displayed.

War brought out tb••• virtue. in tho.e

within whoa they would otherwi•• haveno cbance.

Stendabl could

provide anotber route. tbe black ot tbe' clergy, but be wrote of
an earlier tiae and at a difterent p1ao •• 13

It tbe world were

Dot inberentlT conservative it would not surviv..

It is there-

tor Dot surprising tbat the principle. upon wIlicb nation.
operate are reactionary and archaic.

The idea of a League ot

Nation. in tbe context ot Nineteentb-century

~urope

was tar

too radical to find real acceptance on tbe part of polic1llaker••
For tbere ia no question but that nations would bave to tor.ake
a certain dount at what w.. then taken to be include. 10 the
nation of soveripty.l4 The cODcept of soveript,. drawn. out to
it. laeviiable and undeniable conclusion. is ultiaate11 iapossible.

But nations cling to it and guard against its slighteat

ero.ion .ore tiercely now than at anyt!.e in the history ot
Dationstate..

ADy international organization. if it is to be

~0

13Siendhal·. great novel Le Rouge 8t La Nair" pre.ent.
the .ilitary and the clergy .s tbe only two po.sible avenue. O~
vertical .obil1ty in ••• iety prior to the twentieth century.
14S• e • Willi.. Leo Lucet. S.J. fti!e International
Societla Nature agd ortandaatioD ,\forch••er. Lss.: coII.cet;,f
the Holy Cro •• Pre... 9
p_ 14.
.

't

?

effective, .ustcommit nations to behavior co.pletely antithetio
to their past histories.

And those histories grip to the very

soul of the nation.

They are a part of the unconseious that
influences men's actions. IS And states.en are, after all, me.

subject to tbe same enviroDllental force. as their fellows.
There can be no otheJ" explanation tor the madness that overco•• s
an entire state tor brief periods

ot history.16

There i8.for

example, a Prussian mind as distinct from some other group
oharacteristice of some other people imbued with a difterent
life'-style - a unique perspective resulting fro. the primordial
influence ot so.e other specific environment. l ?

IS s• e , Allred Weber, AKuttuIlesohichtb a18 Kultur80ziololie," Leyden, A. W. Sythof ,3S.

ana. Gem-

16,. 'if. Foerster, Eu;a,e and the

(Ne. York:

Sbe.d & Ward,

l?Foerster,

0e-

I§~

,

p.

cit., p. 63-64.

9!e.tioJl,

I I. THE ORIGIN OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The League 01 Natioa. is an acbievementquite novel in
the history of man.

But it i. ba.ed upon ideala toward aioll

,eneration. of ••n bave b.en inexorably moving.

The League

was tbe first eltective move in tbe direction ot or,aniziog
a world-w!de political and social order, in which the

CO"OR

interests ot humanity eould be .een and served across the
barriers of national tradition, racial differenee, or geographioal separatioD.
Betore the League, it waa beld both in theory
and practice that every state was the sole and
sovereign judge of its own acts, owing no al, legiance to any bigher autbority, entitled to
resent criticism or even questioning by other
States. Such conceptions have disappeared for
ever: it is not doubted, and can never again
be doubted, that tbe co.-unity of nations bas
the moral and lefal right to discuss and judge
the internationa conduct of each of its •••bers. Tbe belief that aggressive war is a cri••
against humanity and that it is the interest.
the rigbt, and the duty of every stat. to Join
in preventing it, is now everywhere taken for
grant.d.18

11; •P. Wal ters. ;pA~B"";;';';'::..aI.--.;.....-.;p...:~:;.p:;:;;:e;....;:o;.:t.....::.;:N:.;;a_t.:;i.:::;.o.::n:::.s.
(LondoD: Oxford Uaivers ty
era was ormorlf
Deputy Secretary-General of
1. P. 1.
8

9

So uncompromising a statement may be open to an unending barrage of criticism and rebuttal, but it is upon
such a premise that the League was founded. 19 Implicit in this
concept that every State bas both tbe right and duty to join
in keeping the peace among the world community of nations is
the principle of universality of membersbip in such international organization as may be established for that purpose. 20
Along witb this would go a necessary retreat from the position
held by most states regarding their status of sovereignty.2l
What then is this sovereignty which must be
abandoned? It is the absurd claim of a state
to a right to denounce at any time by its own
unilateral action any obligation previously
and willingly assumed. Thi. concept of sovereignty demands that nations live in the
Jungle where only unrestrained physical power
is the arbiter of international relations. It
is the epitome of secularised diplomacy and of
statecraft divorced from morality. It is the
philosophy of state absolutism. It contends
that there can be DO superior to the states no
moral law to observe, no Obligation to other
State. to observe, no international law to
respect, no higher authority to acknowledge.
It de.ands international chaos wbere might
IIGrotius Society,"Problem. of the War." See address
delivered by Lord Parmoor in Gray's lao Hall on April 10th,
1918, Vol. IV., 1919, p. XVII.
2°Bolz,"Universality-Aim of 'he United Nations"German Foreilft Policl, Vol. It 1965.
2lWhile it is true, in spite of this strong statement
regarding the degree of s'over.e~ subscribed to by tbe nations
of the world, that they also, for the most part, accept the
principle: pecta sunt .ervanda, the fact remains that tbis 1s
siaply not enough to provla. the basis tor meaningful relat10nships within an international organization.

10

alone r •• ains the only respected retere.
01 disput... Durin& the past three centuries
th•• e claims of exaggerated sovereignty have
been prai.ed and practiced by the modern
State t an.d the resul t bas been international
chaos. 22
IB practice, contrary to its e.pou.ed theoreticalf'.undatie.s, the Leape did not operate on the basis

or

univer.ality
""
ot ...bership, Dor did it de.and aDJ tUBdemental change IB the
attitude 01 atat •• toward the concepts 01 sovereignty they ao
. jealousl, cherished.
Relardins its .ember.hip, tbe League proceeded on tbe
" ...ption tbat a ne. m_ber bad to be an .... t to tbe organizatioD, not a liability.

A ...ber mu.t lacllitate and not

obstruct the cau.e ot peace and .ecurity.23 Just whicl1 . .'lions
.ere in the habit of doln& this was det.rained by delinitio. ot
the League lounders, and later the League raembera.

The original

...bers ot the League designated tho.e nation. elilible for
.e.bership wbieb bad oarried the war against Ge,..any.

Peace-·

lovine nations are not tbose whicb retrain tro. eraed conflict.,
but rather tho.e wbieb fight on the right side. wbich aee...
• oai otten to be determined by who is the victor. Tbe re.ult

~2Luce1. 02. cit., p,.

26-27.

23Radzinski. Alekaander W., "Adaission ot Ne. Membera:
The United Nationa and the League 01 Nations." (Ne. York,
Carneiie Endo..entfor International Peace, 1952).
Se. also Appendix C tor foraalized Qu•• tiona su~itted
by League co.-ittee to State applying tor Adaission.

11

r ••••bl •• lIore a factional alliance than a world organization. 24
A. the firat a.aeably of the Leagu., th. Argentinian

d.legation propo •• d an aaendBent r.garding ••• b.rship (in that
organization) "That all sov.rellD states r.cogni •• d by th.
co_unity of Datio•• be ad.itt.d to joint the l.equ. ot Nation.""
in .uch a manner that if th.y do Dot be.om. • •• ber. of th.
Leagu. this can only be th. re.ult of a voluntary d.cisloD OR

their part. w2S

This propo.al was r.jected a • •carcely co.pat-

ible with the actual condition. of the world. Th. a ••••bly
yot.d tw.nty-nine to tiv. againat tb. . .end.ent.

Uruguay·.

propoaition'.tbat lIe.ber.hip ought to be compulsory for all
nations, and that there should b. no provision for expulsion.
let alone withdrawal, MOWlted to little more than th. stat...at of

8J1

ideal.

In the cours. of its .xi.tenc., adlli •• ioD to the Leasue
constituted an act of true political states.anship. In spit. of
this, at one period or anoth.r, .ver)" recogniz.d state but on.
w.. a .e.ber of the Leagu. of Nation•• 26

Th. exceptio. was

§"Ernst Jiickh, and Wolfgang Schwarz, Die Politik
Deutschlands in V~lk.rbund (Genevel Librairi. Kundl" 1932) p.9.
25League of Nations, Official Journal, Records of tbe
First As •••bly, Me.tings of Co_ittees, Vol. II, p. 224.
26walters, OR. cit., p. 3.

12

The United states ot Aaerica was perhaps the

ironic and tatal.

most significant driving torce in the establishment of tne
League.

Beyond this. abe enjoyed a special position becau.e 01

her new and ill..8nse strength, and her history of non-involve.ent in European altaira (her great wealth and lresh approach
were also sorely needed).

Indeed, the remark was aade that

England and France "gave" the League to Wil.on as a ge.ture
tor the part played by the United states in the war. 2? The
picture is that the League was the result .erely ot the gratuitous

tultl~ent

ot a whim.

But the League's anc •• try waa

ot sounder stock than whiaaey.
The true ancestora ot the League ot Nations were
religious pacitisa and international law. 28

Though both tended

toward tbe same enda tbey .ere be no .eana Identical.

Inde._,

adherents ot one approach very otten excoriated advocate. ot
tbe other.

PaCifists, even to this day, are looked upon with

suspicion and misgivings. 29

There are aeveral quite under-

standable reaaons tor this.

The pacitist, pursued to extre.ity,

lIuat be considered a traitor.
lIaR

he of tend a nature.

In the

1~1ted

underatandinc ot

For his behavior is so tar beyond that

J1Ludwig Debio. "Deutschland un d1e Weltpo11tlk 1.
ft. al3enbourc, 1955). p. lal .

20 Jahrbundert", (Munich:

2Bwalter.

Ope

c&t •• p. 6.

29Ib1d ., p. 11.
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ot most men that it must be

abno~al.

kind, not siap!y of de,r••• 30

It is a ditterence of

The pacifist is prepared to tor-

sake all, even life, tor the sake ot an ideal.

He has coa-

quered tear to such decr.e that th. tundaaental rule of nature,
s.lf-pre.ervation, is no longer operative.

There is nothinc

.ore awesome or frigbtening than a truly tearless .an.

Tbe

saints were of tbis sort, which is wby they are loved only by
posterity.
ti.e."

Hi. neighbor's cry iSI

"Go. be a saint on your

own

One is reminded ot the chapter io Doestoyevsky's The

Brothers Karam"ovl

"The Grand Inquis1tor,"31 1n wbieb Christ

i8 accused of having alienated .an rather than attracted bim
by the nature ot his eXaMple.

If be bad been .erely super-

human, it he bad bebaved as a k1ne of kings or .ightlest of
tbe mighty. men would have understood. and 1dollzed
all ti.e.

bi~

tor

But be waa too subtle. and so de.anded More tban

...n could giv••
Rulers of nationa must deal with great multitude. of
peopl..

Tbey can not ••brace .s practical policies whicb

presulle

an
J,Gc.rata.

.t

3l8G.: Feodor DOGstoeysky - Tbe Brothers Karam.zovA New translation by David Magashack, Vol. 1, Penguin Classics,
L19 (1958) p. 288.
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part ot their aubjects.

Whetb.r or not they abdicate their

reapODsibilitiea by a.eking tbe lowest coaaon d.no.inator. th.y
must act in accord with what tbey conc.iv. to be tbe posaible
tor any particular ao••nt iB tla..

·Politics,· (according to

one definition) "ia the art of the po.alble.· 32 Yb. ach••••
for p.ac. prolfe...e. by pacifists bav. been consldere4 by .o.t
politiciana to be ai.ply unr.a1iatic. 33

On the other haD4, tb.

rul. of law saoftC natioDS haa b.en consid.red equall, lapractical. a4

Ind.e4. natioDs bav. b.e• •xc.edingly reluctant to bind

th••••lv.a to co.pulaory arbitration in an, but the v.ry sligbtest .atters, and .ven then with c.rtaln r •• ervations. 33 !bus
32pi.ld-Yarshal Paul von Hindenburl, .. President 01 tb.
W.iaar aepublic, was embarraasingly outspoken in this regard.
33This .as true as .ell Baong tho.e who believed in a
world order ot peace through law. Cbarles de Vis seber reiterat •• tbi. iaa Theorie• • t aealite.sen Droit International
Public. This position waa taken by .everal speaker. betor. the
Grotioa Socl.ty. Kanaactiona of tbe Grotius Societlt Vol. II.
1911; Vol. VII, 19 I Vol. Xt IUS.

34The aain re.aon tor this, in tbe 81nd. ot those who
otherwl•• would accept tbe etticacy ot le,al .ettlement, is tbe
absence ot .anctions, or aore apecificallYt torce.
35The B&lue conference. in 1899 and 1901 glye aap1e
evid.nce of the poaitions of the various states in this regard.
account ot the conterence. will disclose the dearth of progr.ss in the direction ot compulsory arbitration. ~ong otbers
.ee, Scbuckings work; The Hagu. Conterenc... It is only fair
to say, however, that th. conferences were called to d.al with
dlsaraamentt not the que.tioD ot arbitratioD.

An,

15

the

advocate~

ot peace througb international law, while in

much better position than the pacifists, have had little succ •••
in convincing governments to keep the peace through juridical
.eans.

Still, they bave enjoy.d creater reapect and .erious

consideration not le .. t because, on tbe whole, they repres.nt.d
a .ore distinguished group or individuals.

The worldts tore-

••st legal .inda, its aoat renowned jurists, concerned th....ly••
with international law.

Legal .eana for settling di.put ••

aaong Dation. lormed a lar,e part or the work ot Bugo Grotiu••
the rather ot international law.

Legal principl •• enjoy gre.t

•• t ••m Baong all claas.. of p.ople and what is perhaps ev.n
more i.portant, they are UDd.rstandable.

This is not to • . ,

that every layman can dispute with a scholar in the area 01
jurisprudence, but rather that the law .s a .eans ot social
control is accepted as in accord with man's nature.
Dot orrend any ot bis priaordial urge..

It doe.

The educated and the

illiterate, the rich and the poor alike agree to the .ettl..ent
ot dirterence. by relereace to judicial coun.el. 36 ot course.
it may be demonstrated that the poor conceive tbat in it.
workings. the law militate. again.t thea.

What they would

36 In 80ae 80cieti ••• and in soa. classes within certala
societie., the underpriviledged view the law and it. entorcers
as 8n•• ies. But in it. broade.t .ense which would include
Comrade. Courts in the Sovi.t Union, it i. the aost widely
aocepted formalized .ean. ot .ettling ditterences.

16

change is the agents of the law, not the law itselt.

But even

though it may stand otten as an eoe.y, it is Dot an UDDatural
eo..y.

The law does not insist tbat its advocate. atand apart

tro. tbe reat ot society.
not its propriety.

One may question its efficacy but

There was then rar aore likelihood ot

progress in this area as a .eans for avoiding ruture wara than
in coogrea.es ot paciriat ••
All tbe same, over the years, a great deal ot work waa
done by paCifists as well as by international lawyers.

That

there waa considerable aceo.plished in this direction is 4e.onstrated by the fact that the first drart ot the Covenant ot the
League

of Nations was drawn up in tbe cour.e ot several we.ka'

Intenaive work. 37

This would bave been unthinkable without

l . .ense prior preparation.

Walters, in his book on the League. divide. it. prehistory into three peri04a. 38 The first period co.prise. at
least three .enturies and eovere. the di.solution or the unitie.
structur. ot .edieval Europe .pitoai.e. by the 801y Ro... !aptr.,
S'Walters.

OPe

38 lb1d •• p. 4.

cit., p. 33.

17

into dependent national state., down to the Napoleonic wars.
During that period .everal .che.e. for the preventlon ot war
between the prince. of Europe were publi.bed by scholar17
thinkers.

AIlGIlI the •••er. the writing. ot Sul17, EIIeric

Cruo.,

Willi.. PenD, Abbe'.e st Pierre, Rouaseau, Bentb... and Kant. 39
It is noted that the.. gr.at .en were not pr!aarily known tor
th.ir peaoe plana.
"

Walter. oalls th•• "literary curiositi••• •

The true torce. wbieh would one day 1n the distant tuture !apel
.en to fora a \)ind1nl leacne were those touched upon a\)ove.
paoiti•• and international law.

The paelfis. reterred to iD

th1. instance i8 religious paclti•••
NOD-reai.tance to violence haa not been the offioial
doctrine of the Christian Church since the tl.. of Constantia••

But many individuals and group. prof••••d It and .ere pr.par••
t. sutf.r anT consequence. for their advocaoy.

Th. infl.ence

of tbe.e pacifi.t. was far greater than th.ir naaber.

:II

The

Be.lebe.'s book, Plan. tor World P.ace through Six
Centuri.. cover. all the.e .eh.... in detail. Th.T are ala.
recounted in the Darby paper pr•••nte. before th. Groti••
Society 1n which be adaoniahe. otber writers on the subject
for oa1ttlng tb. now higbly regarded plan of George ot Pod.brad,
KiDS ot Bob••ia.
W. EYans Darby, "So•• European League. ot P.ace"
tranaact&oD. ot Grotiua Societz, IV, 1919, pp. 169-198.
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Society of Frienda 40 particularly baa played a continuingly i.portant role inspiring oth.... noneonforaist churches and earning
resp.ct for their b.lieta.

Ot courae, pacifi•• of any sort

runs counter to interests of governm.nt., for it is a policy
wbicb would end tte independenee et any state. practising it
in a world ot multiple nationalistic .tate..

Tbe sentiaent

r ..ain. attractiYe and p. . .rtu1ly 80ving to maay.41
International 1.w, to tbo.e of a more ratioDal approacb
to tbe a01ution of probl.... and certainly aore academically
oriente', does not excite the .... decr.e of passlon or
devote. advocacy.

Thi. doe. not ..aD that tbere have Dot bee.

a"l t.portaat proponents ot this meana for tbe settleaent 01
international di.pute..

OD tbe contrary. a great oeal baa

been written in tbi. area and -eDT eontere.ce. beld.

The

probl.. ia tbat tbe atudeata of international law are better
aware ot tbe sigaitiaanoe ot certain te..... which de.cribe the
situation in wbich tb. nations of the world rind th•••• IY•••
Th. conc.pt of .0.er.il8ty wbicb tb.y all claia 18 anarchiC,

in.i.t. that .tate.

..y do whatey.r tbey 11k. so

are not bound by tr••ty.42

4o

Al..

ImOWll

long aa tbey

Tbus war i. out.ide the cognizance

as the Quakers.

41 Zahn, OPt cit.

4~cey. Ope cit., p. 14.

R
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of international law.

Sovereignty, aa was mentioned earlier, is

an insurmountable obatacle to tbe building ot foundations for
peace, either witbin the real. of international law, or in the
pre.ence of ardent pacifi...

"Nevertheless, international law

ia the direct ancestor of the Covenant." 43
years, a great deal ot ettort was expended

In its earlier
by

international

lawyers in deteraining when a war was just or unjust.

It was

generally conceded that war could be both just and lawtul.

But

Grotiu. hi.aelf protested against the notion that a nation
could go to war whenever it chose.

Later teacbers of inter-

national law abandoned, in the face of extre•• sovereilaty, tbe
distinction between just and uajust wars.

still, the continuiag

develop.ent witbin tbe fi.ld of international law for.ed the
foundation stonea with which the edifiee of the League waa
built. .Tbe .orier which would hold tho.e stonea together ....
a difterent que.tion, one destined to remain unanawered even to

this day.

Whatever _ay b. aade of tbe tracings otthe develop-

.ent of the idea ot keeping the peace among nations. they were
extremely faint and w.ak.

As a practical matter to world

stat••••D, they were nonexistent.

4SWalters, OR: cil •• p. 5.---
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The second period described by Walters encompasses the
interval trom the close of the Napoleonic wars to the First
World war. 44 Anti-war feeling began to sbow itself in the
realm of practical politics.

The more entrenched torces ot

nationalism held unremitting sway, but they no longer did so
without challenge. 45

Governments were torced to consider the

Irowing voice which demanded they look toward 80me more peacetul means to settle disputes.

The calculated use ot war as

an instrument of national policy could no longer be pursued
aa by Bismarck, however successlul he may have been, without
regard to public and world opinion.

There were tour distinct
lines of development in the League idea at this tiae. 46
Increasing internationalism, that is, interdependence in all

sphere. of activity, and broader and more frequent co.munication.

It was becoming more

were interests common to all.

and

more evident that there

Consultation and the percep-

tion of mutual interests became almost institutionalized into
what is termed the "Concert ot Europe.· 4?
This approach

4i1bid .,

p. 6.

4SBarbara Tucuan, The Proud Tower (New York,
Macmillan Company, 1966), pp. 4b7-4tia.
46 Walters, 2R. cit., p. 1.

The

47Aa interesting account of this informal, intricate
arrangement tor coordinating the foreign policies of the European nations was written by Alfred Ziamern.
The Leafie 01 Nations and the Rule of Law. 1918-1933.
(London: lacmll an &Co., T19~9)t pp. 18-16.
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to the ordering of the world coamunity of nations perdure. to
this day, and has strongly influenced the torelgn policy foraation of the s.veral European nations, particularly England and
Prance, tor generatlona.

The third and fourth line. of growth

througb this period were tbe continuation of the develop.ent of
international law and pacifi •••
Tre.endou. changes In the nineteenth century bad profound and inevitable ettects upon the relations between natioDa.
Industrialization, aodernization, population growtb, econoale
growth, incre.s.d trade, growing ape.iallzation, were but a f.w
ot the tactor. whicb had their i.pact on the conduct ot govera.ent.

New .eans ot coamonicatloD DOW included the ste...hlp,

tbe railway, and the telegraph.
as instruments ot cbange.

They can not be underestimated

The tactor of raw materials, natural

re.oureea, took on new aeaning.

It order were not intused into

the Inere.singly complicated and interdependent aitoation,
chaos would be inevitable.

The solution to some ot the .merg-

ing proble•• was the institution of various speciali••• international agenciea.'S

Sea. ot the •• had a desree ot control over

4dpo110wing 1. a li.t of the internatiunal agencies
(uniODS) whicb were established prior to the outbreak of World

War I.:

1868.
1874.
1875.
1883.
1886.

Iateraational Teleeraph Union.
O.iv.real Pestal Ualon.
International Ottice for Weights and Measure ••
International Union tor the protection of
industrial property.
International Union tor the protection of
works of literature and art.

over the national administrations of the countries involved.
The Universal Postal Union _as the aost co.plete and aueee.stul
or this genre.

Tbere was guod reason for this.

It was in tb.

best interest ot each nation to cooperate with aDd abide by
the regulations ot the union.

Not every Dation tully under-

stood this to begin with, but the vast aajority did. and tho.e
who did not csa. quickly to appreoiat. tbe need lor and value

.r

cooperation in the tu1leat.

The first of tbe.e agencies

was the Danube Coma!ssioD. established in 1856. atter which
the nuaber proliterated, though without gaining any political
int1••nce.

In the are. 01 operation of tbeae organs,

partlci,.~
&

ting nationa did have to 1lalt their own Ire.do. 01 action. but "
this did not

a.e. to

erode the uncoapromlsinc nature of the

sovereignty to which tbey subscribed.

Atte.pts to subject aore

politically volatile que.tiona to international control .ere
8uaaarlly d1 ..1.se' or thwarted.

ae.tricted aa were the.e In-

cipient for.s of international organization. the, constituted

1881.
1890.

1890.

1890.

1902.
1901.
1901.

Pan-lierlean U.lon (ori,. A.erlcan International Bureau.)
Anti-slavery Conlerence at Brussels.
International UBion for the publicatio. 01
Costo•• taritfs.
Central Oftice for the regulation of international transport.
SUIar Convention at Brussel.
International Agricultural Institute.
International Oftice of Health.
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.ore than symbols ot what pacifists wishe. to iapleaeai on a

DO

broader and deeper 80ale.

There .ere innu.erable otber inter-

national societies tormed outside the field of official government activity wbich bore witness to the common nature and

interests of aankind, but they served not a whit in preventing
tuture wars. 49 To be 8ure, most ot these international groups
.ade no attempt whatever to intluence or to beeo•• involved in
or even to conuaent upon intern.ational diploaaey.

The socialist

International was an exception to this pattern, but wbile it
disavowed war and

arnu.ents~

there was such disagree.ent amonc

the beterugen.ous meabership it was

l~o.sible

to secure a

comprehensive and meaningful formal resolut10n in this regard.~O
What remained the lIost voweriul force on the international scene was the amorpbous "Concert of Europe."

Althoucb

Great Britain attempted diligently to make of it a .ore efficient and reliable instru.ent for maintaining order amonc
the European nations, ahe was not able to call together the
nations involved in this group immediately prior to World
w~

•

I. Thua. alter •• tabllsbing a Dotable record 01 aohieve-

49There .ere "Leacao. tor Pe..e" established in
virtually o.ery eoaatry, including Ger.aD7.
50
TaebJIan, op_

s11- t

p. 456.
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ments with regard to the settlement ot proble.s among the
European states, such as the colonial problem in Africa, the
Concert tailed utterly when it was .ost needed.
Perhaps the.ost encouraging develop.ents in the tield
of international order came in the area ot arbitration. 51
Once a dispute had been put to arbitration, the results were
usually quite satisfactory both as to the arbitrament, and the
aanner in wbich it was carried out by the nations involved.
The real problem 181 In determining wbich dispute. sbould be
s.ttled by arbitration, who should aot as arbitrator, and
what tbe basis tor decision should be.
tban this

w..

Even more difticult

overco.ing the extre.. reluctance on the part of

stat.s to bind them•• lves in advance to
ie. ot disputes to jUdicial .ettleaent.

.u~it

.ertain categor-

Tho.e interested 1n

progre.s along tbis line worked to e.tablish a

pe~anent

international court and to basten the coditication ot international law.

Several nations made re.olution. in tavor of

the prinCiple of arbitration but these tailed inevitably to
SlAltbough the Haene conterence. tatled to make
arbitration coapulaory. and only succe.ded in eliciting the
wi.b that it be conaidered. Nonethele •• , the number of ca.e.
put to arbitration rose rapidly, and .tep. were taken in the
direetion ot e.tabliahinl, it not a per.anent Court, experienced
pool ot judse. for bearing ea•• s brought tor arbitration.
Zi••ern. OR. c!i-, p. 108.

2S

'e ratitied. 52 Th. only positive results that accrued fra. the
Haene

Conferences were in this are. ot arbitration of disputes,

but they were desultory at be.t and

80

proved disappointing to

all tbo.. who wished to se. peace-keeping apparatus .trengtbened
Alitation for the abolition of war continued

.~ace.

Societies for peace were fouad.d in seyeral countries 1n the
fir.t balf of the nineteeatb century.

• t international congre.... were held.

8y

aid-c.ntur,y a .erie•

Paoifists were still

no 80re bighly regarded then tbey .ere previously, but they
.er. making aore nolse.

They .ere even finding .pok••••n

..ong tbe aore radical aeabers of 80.e European parli...nt.t
tboulb it 8uat be 8aid that the.. adYocate. u ••d the .ore
practical arsuaeats of the higb cost8 of araaaent. and the
wastefulness of war rather tban the condeanatioD of figbtinl
under ln any circ.stance•• 53 Even so, all proponents ot
non-violent .ethods tor aalntaining peace were leape. togetber

as either lapractical idealists or traitors.

Given the tact

of beavily armed state. witb differing interests

and

contigu...

border., it wae unthinkable to foreswear tb. u•• of arms tor
.elt-protectioD, and unpatriotiC merely to sugge.t sucb a
S!strau••-Hape and Possony, International a.l,tio!!,
(New York: 1950), p. 822.
53At the Mannhela Congre•• 1n 1906 a general strike (an
increasingly popular aeans of protest) was propos.d in the event
ot war. See I Carl E. Scborske, Gar.an SOtial DeaoeraCI, 190§1917, (Boston: Harvard Ualversity Press, 13S), p. 56.
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possibility.

Those who subscribed to such beliet. were sab-

jected to the mo.t excoriating criti.i.m.
pac it i.. was

Aatlpatby to

emotionally based as to preclude rational

80

evaluation of tbose scbe•• s which were realistically thought
out and which took into cODsideration all the relevant tactors
impinging upon a given aituatioa.

Tbus even those approacbes

whicb .ere quite in acoord with "realpolitik" were .purned ..
ridiculous.

Indeed, even atter the Leasue was put into opera-

tion and counted

aaGnc

ita aeabera the majority ot states up. .

the earth, tho.e wbo believed too strongly in the etficacy of
tbat body .a the instrument tor preventing all tuture wars were
eyed, it not suspiciously, at least with a certain degree ot
condescension.
~.taell

That aDY internatioraal organiaation could b,.

keep the peace aong sovereign nations w. . .till con....

..

8.1dered an impractical ideal.

54

The tirat opportunity tangible tor the d.-onatratioD ot
how much progre.s toward institutionalizing .eana tor insuring
peace had been achieved came with tbe convocation ot the Dague
Conterenee ot 1899.

The invitation and idea tor this contere.oe

.ea. froa what M.at natioDs considered a higbly unlikel, source,
Tsar Nicholas II of Russia.

All those nations having dlpl ••atl0

Slebarl•• de Visacher. Ihe.Fi•• et Realities •• Droit
(Paris, 1 5S). p. AI.

laternat~onal Publi~,
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repre.entative. in St. Petersburg were invited for a two-told
purpose,
DOW

to insure peace and to l1ait tbe aras rae..

It ls

felt that the Tsar's motivation tor the conte renee w.s

fear of the new

d.v.lo~ent.

in ar-aaeot ot bis neighbor,inc

stat.s to the .e.t.

Russia did not bave the ao08Y at tbe
ti•• to devote to k•• pinl up aNa procure.ent. 55 Whatever the

e ..e, diploaatists of the period were skeptical of anT ..aningtul results. and did not even want the questioo of 11aitatioD
of ara_ents brougbt .p, let alone acted upon.

Ganaoy particu-

larly was opposed to this question. and ber highest rankine
.11it~y

ottioers and eveo .eabera of tbe

vehe.ently al.inst the Idea.

~overDmeot

spoke out

Tke Prussian spirit and infl••oo.

aanifested itselt with inoreaslng strenlth and abandon.

~~

... not the ooly opposing volee in the ar....nts question aerely
ihe strongest and aost uncoaproaistn,.56

The result of all the

disoussioD relating to this problem were that tbe military
..epre.entatives of the aation. involved in rinding solutlona
leuad instead _ore reason. why it was lapos8ible even to broach
SS"';'e otrer h;d not been quite aliruisticl Russia bad
tallen behind in mllitary tecbnolol1 and was temporarily unable
to finance the r.equipping or her aray. HeDce dis ....ameot
would bave served her strategic interests best." Strau8.-Hupe
and I>o.sooy; I.ternation.l Relationlt p. 571.
S6rrance , because ot her fear or Germany. did not want
Russia. ber ally at the time. to disa.... Ber opposition to
disarmament was silent, but etreetive all the .... in collaborating its failure.
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the subj.ct.

In the tace ot the great enthusiaam r.gistered by

.any at the prospect of this gr.at p.ace conference, its utter
failure as regards the araaaenta question was a bitter disappoint•• nt.

Much

plans for the

~ore

serious work was devoted to the study of

settl.~eot

of disputes by arbitration or tbe

aediation of di8iutereste' powers.

Detailed projects .ere

aubaitted by alre.4y oxiating peace orgaJliaations such aa tile
International Law A.sociation.

The fruit ot this labor was

the drafting of the "Convention tor the Pacific Settle.ent of
International Di.put ••• •

All the invited states .ere sicaator-

ie., and the diploa.tists eonsidered the dGauaent extre.ely
advanced.

It provided for third-part, .ediation "so far a.

circu••tance. allow,·and tor the appointment 01 an international
co..issioo 01 inquiry to aa.eriain the facta of • given aitaation. 57 But, as .aa indicat.d above, any atte.pt to .ake

81The ulttaate alreement arrived at by the signatory
powers at the Bague Conferencea may be .uamaria.d as tollowa,
1. The silnatory Powers shall use their best efforts
to ensure the pacific settlement of international
difticulties.
2. In case of serious disagreement, diploaacy having
tailed, the disqreeing Po.ers shall have recourse,
as tar .a ciroUllstan.e. allow, to tbe ,ood oftic.~
or lIediation ot one or .ore friendly Powers.
3. 1ft such circumstance. an otter of lIe4iat10n b,
third Powers, strangers to tbe dispute, shall not
be regarded as UR untriendly act.
4. In disputes ot 8B international nature. wbicb involve neither national honor nor vital intereata,
and which arise troN difference ot opinion on point
ot taot, the signatory Powers shall have recour.e
to an international C0881.8100 ot 1nquiry.
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arbitration of dispute. binding in advance on ratifyin, stat••
was abortive.

Most atates were prepare. to subscribe to bind-

in, arbitration of disputes

QO

caretully proscribed oategorie ••

However, uni.portant the categories for arbitration, Germaay
'.l

t.

would not acree to lillit her fre.do. ot aotion in the .lighte.'
de,ree.

aeports ot tbe i.roc.edlngs indioate that Germany

unflagging oppo.it10n to any obligation whatever tor arbitration contributed largely to the tailure of the conference on
thiB head. 58

All that could tinally be accomplished, and this

was not to be wholly discounted, was the endorsement ot arbitration as the most desirable metbod tor settling the 10,&1it7
ot disput •• and interpreting treatle..

A aore positive note

... established by the creation of the "Penanent Court ot
Arbitration."

While this was nei_her a court, nor permanent.

It did constitute usable aachinery tor faCilitating the ••ployment of arbitration io tbe settlement ot a Duaber ot
problema over tbe years tollowing.

Betore tbe endinl the

Conference, provision was made for the cODvocation of the next
Conterence.

s.

or

In que.tlons
a legal nalure, and •• peclally
1n the interpret_tie. or applioation of international cOllvention., arbitration sball be
recoIDi ••• a. the .oat etfeotive. and at tbe ....
time the 1I0st equitabl., means ot settling dispute. which dlpl~acy baa tal1ed to adjust.

58. Scott,

Ope

c1S., p. vi.

Eight volatile years later, the Tsar again called together the nations of the world for the second Peace Conterence
at tne Hague.

With the experience of tbe first Conference to

draw upon, participants started .ell in advance to determine

ways to avoid the most vital questions tor whicb they were
••eting to tind solutions.

Tbe question of

be scrupulously avoided. 59

Lovers ot peace who looked with

~

..ent. was to

sucb hope to this new Conterence would have b.en outraged it
they knew bow co.pletely the topic was to be avoided.
would not even be a chance to tail.

There

The British goverllllent

was aware ot the intense interest ot a larg. and growing nu.ber
individuals who d.-anded that 80.ething be done about the
racet and the larler que.tion ot peace.

a~.

In a tew yeara the

voice ot peace was suddealy stronc enouah to be heard. and it
aot obeyed, at least answered.

The representative troM

Britain w. . .s reluctant to .entioD araaRenta and tbeir limitation as any of the delegatea to the Conterence.

But the

loveroment at boa. would bave to answer tor bis tailure to do

s..

Great Britain was not alone in its concern to avoid men-

tioning ODe ot tbe two avowed purposes tor the Conference in
the first place.

00ly the Germans were outspoken in their

denial of tbe .erits of the question.

Whe., at last, the

S9Tbey were to be considered in the next conterence.

Ibid •• p. 29.
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British ortered the resolution that the expenditures tor armaments among the nations attendant be •• rious1y examined. it was
quickly adopted and pursued no further. 60 A great sigb of
reliet .eelDed to greet this deus ex machina.

The question was

raised and disposed of in sbort and painles. order.

That the

resolutioD .eapt nothing at all did not disturb the participants in the least; it rather co.forted them and allowed thea

to get on with tbe mueb more taalliar task of devising rulo.
to,. war.
The Germans stood again unalterably opposed to any
prop ••als with regard to arbitration or the establishment of
a. Pe...anent Court.

tIl that was achieved was an addendUDl to

the state.ent ot the Conterence of 1899 which stated the desirability ot tbe use ot arbitration settling dispute. ot
"ertain kinds.

The addendllll reiterated the desirability of

states baving reeourse to arbitration in so tar as eireu•• tu•••
would permit. 61 Such a statement only undersoored the tailure
of tbe Conferenoe to accOllplleb very much in the way of
aaobinery to a.intain peace aaong nations.
attended the Conference did act

a8

an international body, how-

ever to meet again in eight years' time.
lD;alters, op.

~!1 ••

Tbo •• states which
Unfortunately, the

p. 14.

61scott, op. cit., p. 55.
the Hague Convention of 1907.

Specitically, Article 38 ot
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First World War, wbich they had met to preclude. interveaed.
It is the tilte tro. the outbreak ot tho war to the
Conterenee ot Paris that is included in tbe third period
prehistory ot the League.

The progress aacte

dUI" ing

years preceding World War I was cObsiderable.
both public and private, had been established.

or

the hundred

Many agencie ••
Arbitration.aa

beeo.ing bett.r known, and resort. a to with ,,..ater treq.ency_ 82 .

Forums tor international discus8ion and partlcipation w.re
becomlng institutionali....

CustOM waS being created.

vi•• is an iapresaive anet taken in isolation.

The

But when wbat

needed doing 1s .easured against what . u accomplisbed, the
reaulta are quite difterent.

AD increasingly complex and

divided world seemed to b. moving toward ita own de.truction
end the aachinery to stop tbe process ot maddeaed disint.poatiOD siaply was not ava11able. 63 In that ••n••• all the hUDdred

ye..,.s' development was as notbing ca.pared to progre •• in otber
areas.

The.e included the political institutions within the

nation which its.lt was .hanging in a changing world.

Not so

tile diploaatists either in tbought or .e.de.Th.ir approach to

8!Zlmaern. OR- cit., p. 108.
63Tbe only "machiner7" wbicb would concern itselt with
a problem ot tbis scope was non-institutionali ..d and bad no
••ohani •• tor oal11ng togetber its "...bers," if indeed aueb a
convocation would bave proved succ••• tul in the first place.
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the solution of international

~;roblells

had nut kept pace with

develo!jllents in virtually all other fields of endeavor.

The

unvelievable and total disaster of world War I confronted the
rulers and the peoJ-llea of the world with the compelling need,
recognized in conscience, to reconstruct the institutional
methods for resolving conflicts among naiions.
happen with the firing of tne first. sbot.

This did not

I

I

I

;

I

I

; I

Initially there

was great. patriotic ierver and milituristic spirit.

I

. iI

But as

the war continued and gre. more horrible, touching the life

I

of every persoll, the sentiment t1'iat sucll. awful destruction
should be prevented from ever recurring became the DIode ot
thought.
tor peace.

Great energy then was expended in devisiong plans
Numerous societies for tbis purpose sprang up.64

But, while there was time to draw ull vlans for peace, most of
the people, and espeCially their rulers, graslJed only sUiJorficially what they were about.

There was not the time for tbis

new philosophy to seep into the marrow of the bones of its
adberents.

00 it Nas possible to produce the Covenant of the

League neatly on

l~aper,

but not to nurture tbe principles upon

I
I

i
I

which it was founded and make them operative. either as regarda
governments or citizens.

An1 public eSl)Ousal of peace organi-

zations was proscribed and punished in Germany,

ana

her near

611Hermann Heinrich Grauert, ~r Gescbict.. des Weli~
triedens. des Volkerrects und der Ideee eJ.ner Lig. der J!anOIl!tD.
(Munich, 1920).
~
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neighbors remained silent out of tear.

But even the goverDDlent

1n Great Britain spoke of the desirability of such an organization, and gave encouragement to the private League societle•• 65
The most favorable climate tor the growth and proliferation ot
sucb groups was in the United states where tormer president
Talt founded tb. "League to Enforce Peace.,,66

Botb political

parties in the United states endorsed the League idea, but
Democratie president Woodrow \filson, through his higb olfiee
and powerful advocacy, assumed the position of world spoke....
for the ial.leaentatioD of tbis new international order.

Tbe

position of the United States was quite fayorable for the role
of chiel advocate ot the League.

Aaerica had no bistory of

entangleaent in European affairs and ao was largely free t.roaA
the suspicion tbat inevitablr aet the proponent ot anr scbeme
that bad to do witb the ordering of relations bet.een the
nations of Europe.

Furthermore, she had great .ealth and

power, extre.elr important attributes tor demanding respect
among sovereign

~tates.

The longer the war lasted, the more disposed were the
people, the armies, and their leaders, to wish tor a peace
which was _ore than a cessation in fighting.

The governa.nts

ot the United State. and Great Britain assured the people that
RSL;rd Paraoor address at Grotius Societr. "The League
of Nations", Itan,actions of th, Qrotiu. Societ,. IV, 1919, p.XX.
66 Walters, op, ci~ •• p. 18.
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wbat they were fighting for was a ne. international order which
would diminish the possibilities of tuture warSt and lessen the
burden of armaaents.

The League, per se, had become one of the

war aims.
In the cour.e of the war. a multitude of plans .ere
drawn up ranginl trom tbe merest outline to the most elaborate
and detailed plans for a world federation compriaiol and international parliaaent. 6t

III.

THE QUESTION OF GERMAN MEMBERSHIP
IN TliE LEAGUE

We muat then exaain. ihos. faciors which finally
aotivated the rul.rs of G.rmany to bring that nation into the
League.

Two things were tnvolve.:

tb. decision that sucb a

step sbould be taken, and .aneuv.rinc whicb .ffected the transaction.

The first ia spe.ulationl the ••cond. bi.tory.
Guatav. Str....... 1. ,.n.rally conaidered to b. tb.

arcbit.ct of Geraaay'. entrance into tb. Leacu. of Nations. 68
The political bistory t. which b. was witne.s and principal

actor was chaotic in the .xtr....

Not a voice baa b••n rais.d

Dor a word writt.D wbich 18in.&7. bi. abiliti•• as politician
and stat......

Be7~Dd

tbis. every 1laDD8r of encoal_ haa be.n

h.ap.d upo. ht. by his many biograpb.rs and co. .antators.

Ther.

i •• nonethel.s•• one at ray voic. of opprobria.. 69 which sbould,
at 1... t. give us pau.e in our appreciation of bla as a .an,
and 1D our e••lnaiioa of bia work.
I

(Zurich.

Geraaay' • •a.bersbip ia tbe

e'Erieb EI'Ok,O••Chictte der Wei••rer ReeubliS_
Vol. It 1956. '01.1. 11", '01. IX. p. 4g.

8{1;-aJUl as

i,.

d the hera.ent of §!r69Uana W. Gatzke,
• ..,. (Jobna Hopkins Pre •• ,
'p. !.
See also Godfr.y Scb.elet The Wei.ar a.public,
(LondoD. 194.). p. aaa.
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League was anticipate. Iroa tbe be,inniDg. 70

Indeed. auell .t

the thought which provide. the background tor the League idea
derive. fra. German Citizens, particularly tts jurists.?l There
were Leagues tor pea.e organized in

Ge~any

aa .ell as in other

countries ot the world, and Germany'. participation in the
Hague Conference. and the Paris Confer••ce bears te.tiaony to
the exlstenoe of the Idea.

BeyoDd this. any organisation whioh

intended to be aore than

allianc., or at least pretended to

aD

be fIOre, >; could not possibly exclude the geographical heart of

Europe.

The Coacert ot Europe would bave b.en oacophonoua,

indeed it Geraany were not one of tbe playera.
Bu.t

the Leacue a8 an ideal and the League in reali tf

were quite different matters.

Bowever .ucb discussion .igbt

devolve about an international or eve. supranational organization, no statesman conceived of it beyond tbe abstract.

'or

one tbing, f •• people, outside some of the rulers of Germany.
believed tbere was about to be a great war or at least war,
was i.-inent and at that aoaent inevitable.

The Germans aoved

'°Betore the war was ended and the Treaty.t V....saille.
drawn up, tho•• nations occupied in developing plaas for a
League of Nations worked on tb. a.sumption that Germany would
hold .e.bership by virtue of ber position aIIong W•• tern nations.
France and England both held tbi. at~itude.
?IVeit Valentin, a;8Ch1Ch$' cit! 1Ik.rbunde,edanke- in
Deut8cblag4. (Serli8: u.. &,11.... 03. }
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inexorably in that direction, but they .ere alone in so delng.72
That i8 not to say that other nations did not contribute to
the altiaate outbreak ot hostilities, but only to indioat.
that in no other country were there leaders oriented in tbe
way the German ailitarlsts .er•• 73

Perbaps every nation bas

It. b-.ks. its glorifies ot war, 1t. frustrated heroe., but
rarely are tbere to be found responsible aen ot high pOSitions
who expre.. theaa.lve.

did many ot the more highly plaoed
.ilitary mId civilian Geraan leadors. 74 Tkus the . .n who
88

guided a.naJq's de.til'l7 wera 1a

DO way

task to an ..s.blaga ot other Dation..

natural

DOl"

tamora!.

It might

o~.n

ready to oonsilo their
War was neither u-

be the highest go04.

What

... unaatural was tor a soveraign nation to give into other
bands decisions as to when, where. and it it sbould tight.
Again the question.

bow did Germany find its way into

the League?
The culture that was developing 10 Ger..ny around the
cloae of the ainete.nth century &l\d wbicb ....tur.d .. enra"

728ernhardi-Foerster both agre. on this point.
Bernhardi, OR. elt., p. 11.
Foerater, Ope clt.,
4-7.

p,.

73Foerster 1. partioularly lns1ste~t on this point and
concernod le.t it be torgotten or .1ni.i.ed.
ciS •• p. 4.
7480 outspokenly aggressive were 80a. of the German
leadera such as Bind.aburg and vonSe••kt that they did 80cb
da..ge to the diplomatic positlon of tbeir foreign .1niater.

0,.
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ordinarily rapidly in the beginning ot the twentieth century
gave rise to a .egalomania which pervaded the entire nation.
the aystical notion ot "Yolk."7S This was more than nationali ••
it went beyond pure raoi.a, although these two eleaents were
boldly .anit•• t.
4estill7' I

It was a beli.t in eoae vaguely defined

Gentall1 was to be the leading nation of Europe, and

as such, of all mankind.?6

This posiiion was bers as of right.

The GeJ"llaa people were in. every way superior.

It is aIIazinc

how tolerant one can be of anotberts opinioD, bowever extre.e,

If it bappens to be particularly flattering.

Of course, there

.ere othe.. powerful currents ruaning ihrougb Geraan society at
tbe .... ti.. , allot wbich hadtbeir effect on shaping the
nature and direction ot her history.7?

dar

811

'!Pri ts Ste.... foil tie8 of
t.tal ~se!1tt DouhleARchor Book t (New Yori. a:araen£y. IllS,.

76 w• Evans Darby. in 8 paper rea4 betore tbe Grotlus
SOCiety 08 Nov••ber 28, 1916, recounted an interview conducted by an Aaerican journalist, Mr., Swope, in which a wide11
known German protessor, SteAgel, was askedl "whetber he believed tbe Empire (Ge",,,,) would participate in tuture
international conference. 8$ tne Hague." R. gave "no" as his
answer, and said "that such Conference. would be unnecessary
under a Geraan peace " which be aelined as a sort of su,erstate, in wbich the 4.r.afta would enforce order in tbe World.
"That one condition of prosperous existence, especially tor
the neutrals," be aaid,· i . suhal.sion to our supr... direction. Under our overlord.hip all international law would
become a.perrluous, tor we, of ourselves, would instinctively
give to each one his rights."
Grotia. SOCiety TrfD!aotioDI, Vol. II. 1917, p. 146.
778888 IColm. The Miad. of GeNU,. The Education ot •
Nation, (New Yorlu Harper'; Io'w, 1080' pp. S:§1 and 212-308.

The shocking provisions or the Versal11.. Treaty pro-

voked a defensive reaction on the

iJart

or Germans which

militated against their ever learning anything about what sort
of philosopby poase.sed their soul..

It also put tbea in a

hu.l1lating position in relation to other nations.
ceive-u

th~mselves

or

to be one of the great powers (it not the

It was intolerable that tbey should be watched by

greatf:st).
tealla

They coo-

foreien inspeetors to e.sure against their recovering

themselves.

It was beyond bearing that foreign troops sbould

be occupying tbeir sovereign territory, and that they could
Dot fortify their own frontiers.

A Ir.at llower at the lIerey

of every neighbor was unthinkable.

Yet the situation persisted.

All tbe other great Euro.pean nations duly beld their places on

the Council of the

Leaaa.

of Nations.

place to be at the moaent.

The world took tbe League quit.

seriously tor the most part.

. cians. 78

It was the tbing, tbe

But It was not good

Not so the international politi-

to... to express

public, nor was it particularly prudent.

Olle .'.is

c7llicism ill

There might even bave

b ••n a glimme.. of beli.t In thia new metbod of conducting international relations.

Perbaps there was even a gliamer of

bOp., but it was faint.

No couatry was aore .keptical than

Germany.

But ...bership in the League was desirable fro. many

other points of vie. than that it was a means of keeping the
peace.

18Waltera,

Ope

01$., p. 28.
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It is ironieal that membership in tbe League eould
provide Germany with the opportunity to reconstruct herselt
as a formidable military pewer. 19 She could argue that ••-bership was impossible so long as she could not fulfill one
obl1catlon ot ••mbership; auely, the article calling for the
collective us. of ar.. and men against any peace-breaking
n&t10n. 80 She could not pledge what ahe did not bave. Wore
1auBedlately important t -the substitution of a League te. to
inspect the state of Geraany's compliance with the terms ot
ber disana_ent etmabled Gerllany to rid herself ot tb.e painful
scrutiny of tIle previously ubiquitous Allied inspection teams.
An

additional proviso gave Germany the right to deterMine the

particulars as to ti.. and place ot the League inspection.
Still turther, Germany could more strenuously demand the deoccupation of the Rhine by Frencb troop$.

A.part fl"oll any

'§Gat&ke. in a bibliOgraPbicai Dote, explains the
paucity of written references to Gorman rearmWlent by -civilian
and lIili tary Geraan lead.era. "There was tbe constant tear on
the part ot eV$ryone involved, that news ot the Reich.webr t •
secret operations aisht leak out. ADd.s Severing once put
1t:""lf one write. it doWD., it is as good as betrayed. ltt
~..esella.nn and the «earm_eat of GeI"lUUlI. Saltillo... , 1954, p.120
e Increase In armaments can Se Illustrated by the rising de-·
tense bUeltet. Military expend.iture. went troa 476 mil110D
.arks in 925 to 504 IIl1110n in 1925, and 553 million in 1927.
And tbis was not the entire aaount, tor clandestine military
payments totaled between 5.5 and 6 millioD marks.
Eyck, oe. oit., pp. 143-149.
80Artiole 16, Covenant
Appendix.

or

the League ot Nations.

a••
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interest whatever in the ideals of the League, it was all to
Germany's advantage to become a member of that international
organization.

On the part of existing members of such an

organization. there usually is the feeling that an ever ready
conference table is a vitally important thing. and that a
continuing

dialo~le

will forestall resort to arms.

To ttchiev.

this, the members of the organization are quite willing to
admit to membership states which
stated requirements.

othe~viRe

do not fulfill the

Since it would not be considered "fair

play" to behave with suspicion toward a sovereign equal, it is
aore difficult to keep a member nation under surveillance than
a non-member.

Schemes for disaraaaent generally tail because

ot the extreme reluctance of nations to allow any aeaningful
form of on-site inspection.

The only euccessful venture in

thia area was feasible by its peculiar natu.re and lill! ted
scope.

Major ships are not eas1ly hidden. either in the con-

struction state or afloat.

It is not very difficult to

measure the tonnage of a natioD'£ warsbips. particularly when
all harbors are open to coamerc1al traff1c.

Whether or not a

shipyard can potent1ally construct a battleship, it cannot clo
so in

80• •

secret sbed.

Nor can it be accomplished in a week.

Long before it beco••• a tact. the fact of its building is
obvious to all.
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Two approaches to avoiding war in the settling ot international disputes have generally been taken:
discussion.

arbitration and

This, of course, excludes the device of collective

security wbich is tinally the metbod ot peacekeeping "resorted
to" by the League and the United Nations.

Collective repul-

sion ot aggression is obviously resort to arms, hardly a
peaceful settlement ot a dispute.

ThiS, of course, is the laat

resort atter the above named appro ache. bave tailed to provide a solution.

ot the two, the

preferred by most nations.

latte~

discussion, Is anch

ArbitratioD, unfortunately, re-

quire. at one point or another that a nation pro.is8 to abide
by the finding of some extraneous power.

There i. no recour.e-

it i. the surrender of som. degree of SOVereignty.
intolerable.

This is

When one loe. beyond this to the question ot

coapulsory arbitration wherein a nation bind. it.elt in advanoe
to the resolution of certain disputes by a third-party judgement, the impinge.ent upon sovereignty is si.ply unthinkable.
There remains, ot cours., the ongoing dialogue, the per.anent
conterence table.

It is inconceivable that nations can per-

siat in their aystical beliet in the etficacy ot this medium
. tor ke.ping peaoe when history records

80

8801 instances where

this provided a convenient diYersioD for use by stat•• bent
upon disturbing deeds.

There are instances which .ay be dra. .
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troa any epocb,81 but never More than recent ti•• s botb in and
out ot the League and United Nations.
episode

or

These range frOM tbe

the Trojan Horse to that of the e.i8.arie. fro.

Japan on tbe 7th ot Dece.ber 1941.

The old diploMatists in-

sisted that such a body .s the League

A••••bly, and

eve. tbe

Council. would bave the tendency to de.troy all po.sibility

or

e.

.eaningful dia10cue aad result ratber in a pre8tigious plattora tor de.asogues.

It baa not prov.n all tbat bad, Bor.

tbe contrary, baa .uch been
.tat•••ansbi,_

aoco~li.hed

on the level ot

Th. bope perdure., all the saae, that as lOBI

as words tlow, blood will aot.

So it was that Geraany had eyery reason to pursue
...bersbip in tbe League quite apart fro. any belief in the

League'. idea or principles.
ot Dr. str••••ann.

This she did under the guidanc.

This is not to say that tbe DatioD in it.

beteroceneity ot political parties at the ti•• was of one
aind 1n this regard. 82 Tbe account of the maneuvering that
went on within Geraany on the one band. and within the League
on the otber. 1s ab.orbing to say tbe lea.t.

Tbat story shall

be reiterated but first ther. i8 another tactor regarding
Germany'. de.ire to enter the League whicb Bust b. disclos.d.
IICountries still see. to be able to talk and sboot at
tb. s ... ti•••

8~.ary Asbby Turner! Jr., str••••ann and the Politics
01 tbe We1aar R. ubllc. (Pr1Dcetoa: PrIne.toa UnIversIty Press,
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Germany felt herselt inordinately huailiated by tbe Treaty or
Versailles in which was incorporated the Covenant of the League.
She had suttered iameasurably as a result ot tbe war.

Condi-

tions atter the war .ere even wor.e, if tor no other reason
than that there was

DO

longer the compelling distraction ot

the great conflict itself.
naugbty child.

Now she was being watched like a

Not being a aember of tbe League. she was ex-

cluded froa tbe councils of the "greaf powers.

It is not easy

tor a nation ot people to accept guilt, either as individuals
or aa a country, tor a contlict involving
the world

80

deeply.

great a part of

80

In the end, tbe citizen aust aake an

act or faitb in bis leaders or else be can

DO

bis citizensbip with it. attendant duti.a.

longer retain

ODe may disagree

on policy, but there aust remain an unfailing trust in those
who guide tbe country, Dot so Much that they

a~e

tollowing the

wisest policy, but that they truly represent the interest of
the nation.

It is possible then to condeaD tbea tor tool ish

actions, but never for treachery.
CaD

be no que.tion of guilt.

at the behest ot traitors.

If tbat is so, then there

A DatioR doe. not take up arms
An inordinate aaount of energy was

expende. in propagandising tbe "CUilt-lie.n83
aDDeoessary tor the .oat part.

It was probably

It indeed Geraany was at fault,

bow could she hera.lf ha.. had to endure such pai.?
83Ericb Eyck,op. cit •• p. 96.

In the

courae ot their suffering, the German people expiated their
sina.

When, after the wart the bardships and sorrows con-

tinued, it was siaply too aucb to insist that they merited
even aore privatioDs and must at the same time acknowledge the
justn•• s ot it all.
The school books of a nation understandably lay sreat.st eaphasia upon those events in the world which arfect that
nation's bistory. Nations, even as individuals, are egocentric.
It is one ot the factors which make for survival and there Is
notbing more basic than preservation of selt.

In tbe aodern

epoch tbose states bave known greatness which have cultivated
a broader vie. ot the world, wbicb bave developed a sen.e ot
proportion.

That is not to say, however, that in so doing

they bave oeased to look upon the world other than with th..•• lve. as its center, but rather that the significance ot other
torces was recogni.ed.

The Germans presuaed a place 880n& the

ereat nations ot the world.
there.

Their history books placed the.

They could not lone tolerate a le.ser role.

Spain was

once such a power.

In lour centurie., she bas not learned t.
accept being thougbt ot or treated a8 1•••• 84 Sbe has of courae

14Waltera give. a very .oving account ot SpaiD'. withdrawal fro. the League tor the reason that she could not give
over her place on the Council to Geraaay and still re.ain within the organicatioD. His aooount is s.naitive perbaps be.ause
he was a part of the working of the League as its Deputyse.retary. op ••it., pp. 388-389.

adjusted bel" everyday activities to accord with tbe facts.
bel" spirit cannot acknowledge it.

But

In the case of GeraaQ1, tbe

tacts indicated that she belonged Baoag the great powers.

Her

cross was that the otber great powers for tbe aomeot refuse.
to allow her ber rightful place. 8S They atte.pted, .s it were,
to keep her dowo 10 spirit .s .ell as body.

This would oot do

at a ti.e wben that couotry was already so distressed io spirit.
For this reason alone GeraanT aust enter the League.

It tb.

League. as instituted, bad been identical with the more advanced concept of what it ought to have beeo. Geraany aever
would have b.en adaltted.

Not that m••bership was to be so

exclusive; on the contrary. it was to be universal in principal.
Betore it was officially written out of exi.tence, every recog-

nized nation but one was included ..one its membership.S6
Since the League foraed a part of the Versailles Treaty, .....
bership in that organisation nece •• arily iapli.d coapliance
with the Treaty.8?

GeraanT nev.r coapletely tultilled the

IIGreat.st opposition to Ger.an ae.berehip in the
League cam. froa France, although, at the very outs.t of ita
fOUDding, Franee indicated, at least off101al1y, that ab. was
aaenible to German inclusion as an original aember.
86Walters, 02- cil-. p. 3.

87This fact was greatly deplored by .any co. .entators
on tb. Leacue. Se.the paper by Sir Grab_ Bower. Grotiua
Society Proceedings, Vol. VII, 1922. p. 93. On the etber
band. it has been argued that if the League had not b••n mad.
a part of the Versaille. Tr.aty, it would never have co•• into
existence.
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obligations laid down by the Treaty.

She did not, at first.

siaply ignore the aore burdenseae or odious provisions, though
at one period, it seemed as it hostilities would have to be
renewed in order to force her coap1iance. 88 It was precise1T
the tact that tbe only eftective aeans ot coereion that could
be levelled at Geraany was armed toree that led the weary
world to condone Geraant,'s tailure of coap1ianee to the letter.
,towever convincing the excuses sbe gave tor her behavior, it
pursued they would hav. proven inadequate.
engage in pursuit.

No one wanted to

It was tar easier tor the aoment to accept

tbe excuse. tendered.

It is ever thus:

ne •• are not in the bands ot visionaries.

government and busiThe visionaries are

present to provide the ideological apologies but not to deteraine daily operating policy.

The operations are always at a

tactical nature, and being

liaited, tolerate elements that

80

in the very long analysis .a1 contain the seeds ot d•• truction.
Appeasement is as natural to .an as walking upright.

The

greater part ot our lives is spent trying to avoid the inevitable.

Neither.an nor nations bave learned to deter pleasure.

One does not bear of dictate. ·live year plans· in tree
.

lAih.n the bead ot the Geraan deleeation to Versailles,
Count Ulrich eon Brockdortt-RaAtaau. then toreign .inistr.,
returned to tace 111. lover_ent with the shooking terms of the
treaty. they absolutely retuse4 to ratily it. The alternative,
ot course, would have been to renew the fighting until it was
accepted. a horrifying prospect to either side.
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societies.

It 1s only the torcing of policy to

conto~

with

ideology that makes for its employment within totalitarian
regimes.

And even here every compromise is made.

tic nations of broad suttrage, those in power
goods" or expect to be voted out ot otfice.

IIUSt

In de.ocra-

"deliver the

Even for the high-

est of caus.s the peopl., generally, have a very 11m1ted
patience.

It is not all the fault of the electorate, however.

'lbe leaders are also oreatures of the sam. environment which

demands immediate satisfactions.

Sacrifice in the present tor

the sake of future gains is for the te. highly motivated individuals who oan struggle for abstract goals which they are
wholly unsure of aohieving.
porize:

The rule ot behavior i8 to t . .-

perhaps things will be set aright and then sacrifice

will bave been unnecessary_

It not, tben tbe evils wbich may

come will be met when they are clear and present.

Irbe old

adage of ". stitcb in tilDe" is not convincing enough.

It is

astounding that so many were so surprised when Hitler actually
did wbat he threatened to do in Meln Kame.

How Nazi Germany

became a reality is a lascinating study which in itselt tells
that story of man. 89 It is relative here insofar as it illustrates how unrepentant aDd unregenerated Germany was after her
gO
deteat in the Great War.
She Dever was ready to accept the
"
89Fritz Stern·. study. "The Politics of Cultural De.pair", is devcted to tracing o.e aspect of this que.tioo.

90... W. Foerster: MOP! ~ the Get!8Il 9!!e.tio!".
(New York: Sheed & Ward, 1
" p. 72.

wague idea and every thin,; sbe did proved it.
that sbe was

80

What waases is

carele •• in aot hiding her teelings.

She did

Dot approAch her conquerors with humility or any sign ot contrition.

When she indicated bel' own ineligibility for reasons

ot bel' not being able to assu.. her sbare of those obligations
of the League which required the co. .itaent ot arms tor collective derense, sbe did so only to

rear.aIlent.
WaB

~pen

the way to bel' own

Vt'hether or aot she could 11"e up to the Covenant

a. question quite simply never asked.

Germany could be

quite cavalier about this since she knew well that tbere could
never be a true League of Natioos without bel'.

ot eours., did not disturb bel' one wbit.

That tbought,

Without Germanyt •

••• bersbip, the League would be oe; Ilore than an alliance against
German,_

Obviously, it was all to the good of Germany to be-

co•• a m.aber.

She ••• t of necessity be treated as an equal

and then the .ost galling aspect of the League, that it was

an alliance of victors, would be done away with.

There could

be virtually no negative aspects fro. the German standpoint aa
tar as non-Gentans were concerned.

But this was not to reckon

with the actual situation 1n Germany. the state of the German
.ind.

Much work has been done to determlne just wbat the

German mentality was since it haa given rise to the greatest dis
turbanee of tbe entire first half of the twentieth century.91
11

!atioD
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It is untortunate that the attention .pan ot adult •• even aa ot
children, is so limited.

Thus a question that was never

adequately an.wered is laid to rest when an answer would be
moat instructive to all .ankind.

But we concentrate upon

those things which i_ediately iIIpinge upon our lives and will

not grant the time and economic resource to what is termed idle
speculation.

It ••••• , .ven as the world growa richer and

better able to support ivory towers t that less is spent, both
proportionately and actually, in

80

doing.

The German que.tion

which perdured through a second World War More terrible than
the Great War which gave birth to the League ot Nations. waa
solved tor the . .ment by an accident and little more attention
1s given to It. 92

Th. Ger-an need to be recognized by the nations ot the
world as one ot the great powers, and the will to rear., .ere
. two ot the strongest forces in deter-ing her toreign policy.93

•
92The allusion here is to the tact that Germany was
divided iato Eaat and We.t Germany as a result ot the manner
in which she was conquered and occupied in World iiar II. The
exact boundarie., according to Cornellu. RJaB's book, "Tbe
Last Battle,· were tile result partly of the mislaying ot the
plan that P,re.ident Roo.evelt endor.8d tor capturing Berlin,
and the deplo)~ent of the British and American armies in
England prior to the landing on the continent. Divided as she
iS sbe does not pose the threat to world peace that she did
PI' l or to the First and Second WO"ld ,tar.
93LVdwig Zimmermann.

lra dar wei.ver Reeub1ik.
I9S8), p. 75.

~ut.Cb! Au•••neolitik in de,

(01 tingen:

Ulis'teraciUliClt-Ver

ac,

52
As far as the German leaders were concerned, joining tbe League
would facilitate those ends and grant permission by detault
to rearm.

When, a very tew years later, it became uncomfort-

able to continue on ber course because of disapprobation within the League, sbe quickly witbdrew. 94 She had, in the .eantime, built up ber strengtb so that sbe could leave with
impunity.
One of the reasons tbat it was so difficult for Germany
to enter tbe League was that sbe was unable to explain her
true reasons for joining to tbe various domestic tactions who
were opposed.

Had she done so, sbe migbt have built a con-

sensus at home, but the League would then surely not have
invited her membership.as

It was Dr. stresemann who managed,

througb incredibly adroit .an.uvering, to torge aggrement out
of severely antipathetic tactions.

The parties on the right

.ere inexorably opposed to the Versailles Treaty and anything
connected with it. 96 They resented most strongly the "guilt
clause," the reparations, and the tact that tbe League it.elt

bad

been

made a part

ot

tbe

Treaty_

It was

§4GermaDy announced her withdrawal trom the League on
October 23, 1933, considerably le.s than a decade after sbe
entered.
951t is seldom possible, for diplomatic reasons, to
explain tully the reasons tor torelgn policy moves. Even it
they could be divulged, most individuals, imperfectly informed,
would still not understand.
96Turner, OR. cit.

53

quit. simply impossible tor a single nation to accept sole
r.spon.ibility tor the most extensive and heinous contlict the
world had ever known. 97 Th. r.parations s •••• d motivated by
vengeance and were otherwise dee•• d completely uorealistic. 98
Tbis evaluation was held by many individuals outside ot Germany,
but the tact remains that, in the end, Germany could have paid
the. without suttering mucb more than she did by reneging. 99
Obviously, it Germany could not accept guilt tor the war, sbe
would not accept the reparations exacted ot her.

For, it she

w.r. merely the loser in a war, she could well look upen the
ter.s ot tbe treaty .a exce.sive and vindictive.
understood in relationship to the guilt clause.

They must be
It is the

difterence between the sentences meted out tor tirst-degree
murder and manslaughter.
There was and i8 in Germany, as well as in every other
part ot the world, a sincere beliet that not only is war
natural to man, it is a positive goOd. lOO The theory popularized by Darwin, survival ot the tittest, io some ways shocked
the world and disturbed ita complacency.

But in and ot itselt,

97Foerster doe. not agr.e with -this, he insista that

it was not only possible but n.c.ssary tor Germany and the
world. Ue teared the consequences ot an unrepentant Germany.
The Second World War had not yet begun.
Foerster, Ope cit., p. 35.
98The general opinions ot most coamentators past and
present accords with this-See Eyck, Vol. It p. 106.
99 Foerster,

OPe

IOOaernhardi,

0

cit., p. 35.
• cit.
p. 11.
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it holds a strong attraction in general tor fascists and
racists 1n particular.

In war one observed this theory

operating at its higbest level.

War, according to Prussian

thinking, is a Deoessary and beneficial state of affairs.

It

does away with the weaklings of society and gives the strong
man a cbance to beeo.e heroes. Without war, it is held by
so.e, civilization is doo.ed. lOI Abov. all otber groups, th.
Prussians exe.plify tbis attitud•• IOa

External peace for

th•• would be immoral, an unnatural state.

The League, however,

is founded upon the principle that war ought to be excluded
a. a .eans of settling internatioRa! disputes.

The Firat

World War .ertainly de.oDstrated the !apotence of war as a
dispute-s.ttling a.chanisa.

For it did not .ettle anything.

Tbe proof of tbis could be .een in the inexorable move.ent
toward a second and even more dreadlul world conflict.

The

seeds for that war were already.... by the ti.e the peace
w. . .ottled. Those who were responsible tor putting together
tbe League as a functioning organization and working within
it. lr..ework were tar Ie •• advanced in tbeir thinking than
tbe theorists who established its principle., and what i • •ore
i.par.ant, did not give it their lull .easure of understanding.
IUllbi4.t p. 18.
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For the British Foreign Ottice, the Covenant was conceived .s
an

improved and enlarged Concert ot Europe, so tor President

Wilson the Covenant was an improved and enlarged Monroe
Doctrine. IOa In accord with this reasoning, the Britisb did
not want guarantees written into the Covenant.

Since they

conceived the League as rather a aore institutionalized continuation of tbe cooperation of the great powers, tbey did
not want obligations as part of the arrangement. I04

There

was no tradition upon whicb to found sucb a system, and
lacking such, there was utter pesst.l •• as to its eCticacy.
Considering the British attitude toward this questioD, and
their retusal to concur In the Japane.e ettorts to include in
the Cov.nant a statellent relating to discrimination because of
race or nationality, one wonders what they expected to create
with

thi~

ne. League.

The French, at least the jurists, .eemed more amenable
to the spirit of the League as enUDciated by Wilson.

Part of

the reason for tbis ia tbe French legal syst •• and, hence, the
French legal mind.

The le,al settle.ent of dispute. reach.s

tor its touchstone toward a fairly high level of jurisprudence.
An internatioaal court of arbitration could not b••• tablished

on common-law principles.

In order tor such a court to begia

lOSZi..ern, 02. git.,

-

I04Ibid ., p. 245.

p. 216.

-
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functioning in an already complex world it would have, of necessity, to work from a full set of codified laws.

Furthermore, in

settling a case at arbitration, previous cases may not be cited
as ruling precedents. lOS

It is acknowledged that each case

is unique, that the circumstances, considering the nations
involved, and the coaplex and ever changing relationships
among nations, make it impossible to apply the findings of one
cast to any other.

Of course, the previous verdict. are re-

corded and referred to for insight, but tbey do not constitute
a determining tactor to the resolution of any subsequent case.
AD

international court tben must operate on tbe basis of civil

law.

A

court system founded on sucb principles of necessity

must concern itself more witb evolving tbeory, and in this
area the French jurists were particularly adept.

Tbey were

better prepared to view tbe League as an entirely new aystem. 106
And tbey were more willing, in tbeory, to experiaent.

In

reality, it was the politics of tbe situation tbat ruled. 107

105J • L. Brierly.
Odtord University Press,

"The Law of Nations" (New York:

1981), p.

si.

106 Ziamern, oe, cit., p. 188.

I07YlSScber. OPe cit., p. 75. "La Faix du monde ne
a'organis. pas dans 1 'assirait. L'organisation international.,
a quelque moment ou dans quelque moment ou dans quelques conditions ~utelle se constitute, natt dans un cli.at politique
donn'.
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sentiment and even intellect

eWl

carry the behavior of nations

only so tar, after which a mor.basic factor becomes operative
and finally determinatlv.,that of survival.

Just as with in-

dividuals, states revert 1amediately to primitive behavior

under extraord.inary circumstances.

War is such a. circUlistance.

In tbe last extremity, a state .mploys those aethods which are

aost taaili&r, and when tie. is wanting, judge. the actions of
other state. on the basis of historical aaalysis which may be
arcbaic and obsolete to such degree that it is completely
inoperative as a motivating factor 1n that stat.·s behavior. 1OS _
There wepe then, on the part of the allies, two rival
conceptions of tbe League:

For Britain it remained a co-operative association of independent states. For the French 109
it was an incomplete project of a super-state.
Just as the French vi •• was conditioned by their civil law
heritage, the ancient legal institutions and systeas ot Great
Britain prepared ber to approach the Covenant as she did with
an attitude of reluctance toward specifying in advance what
action members were to take under 6iven circumstances.

It was

the habit ot the British nation, very pragmatically to .eal
with situations as they arose in whatever manner which ••••ed
hest suited tor the

000888ioo.

In the operation of the vast

1000oerster, OR. eil., p. IS.
l09Z1amern, op. eil., p. 346.
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Britisb Empire, sucb flexibility was well tailored to tbe
heterogeneous needs

or

situations which at tl..s required wbat

appeared to be conflicting policies.

In order to understand a

nation which operate. in tbis fashion, it is necessary to study
its history over an extended period gradually building up a
framework against wbicb the individual acts and policies of the
nation may be evaluated.

With regard to the appreciation that

. both Germany and France bad of Britisb motivation, Zimmera
wrote:
In spite or their constant contacts with
British statesmen, extending in M. Briand·.
case over a great lIany years, both he and
Berr stres •• ana .ere fundamentally ignorant
about Great Britain and the British Commonwealth.110
This lack ot understanding between states made the
work of tounding the League more difficult and doomed its
functioning, at least in the more essential areas, to l"rustration and ultimate tailure. lll It precluded the possibility
for meaningful dialogue, and was largely responsible tor the
fact that while the meBbers came to accept the principles ot
the League in theory. they bad Dot the slightest belief in
their practical application.

The machinery for keeping the

peace was in existence, but DO one cared to push the buttoD,

110Ib&d. t

p. 338.

111Yisscher, OR. ell •• p. 81.

•

neitber those who believed the macbinerr would work, nor thoae
who were certain it would not; the former because tbey could
not, in tbe tinal .oaent, accept that which contradicted their
tradition, heredity, and experience; the latter tor obvious
reasons.
The majority ot Germans belonged to tbe two categories
above.

Under those circumstances, the question imposes itselt

as to how they determined upon membership in that organization.

Returning to the vie. or politics as the art of tbe posslble,
. their action was quite appropriate.

The man who led them

through it then, Gustave streseaann, 8ust be admired tor the
auecessful manner 1n whicb he practiced the art.

That this

involved duplicitr on tbe level of ofIi cia1 proaunciation ot
policy was inev1table. 112 To provide a ca.pletelr detailed
account of all the factors taken into consideration in the
tor.ulation ot policy would be impossible, and if so.ewhow
;"t:~,

sebieved, would itself prove a talsehooel.

course open to the leader of a nation.

There is no oUle..

In the bargaining

process tbat is international polities be 8ust try for the
best deal be can get.

The language be ••ploys to sell it to

both aide. can not uaually be ldenttcal.

Gatzke in him mooo-

graph on rearaa.ent rollowlng World War It implies tbat

II~Gatzk.t ~e. cit., p. 111. "It tbis policy was twotaced that was not entIrely streB ••ann's tault."
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stresemann might have been lying when he steered Ger.any into
the League. ll3 A recent study of stresemann and his politics
takes the position that the answer is tbe most obvious:

be

simply was extremely pragmatic, or, more specifically, a
pragmatic conservative. ll4 liber. the line betweeu pragaatis.
and opportunism is drawn remains a valid question.

His transi-

tion from opponent to proponent of the new regime constitutes
the most controversial facet of his career.

The explanations

most oCten prof1"ered are those of conversion or the above tuen-

tloned opportunism, the choice usually coinciding with the
tone of the critique.

i~t.ver

the cas., the political situa-

tion within Geraan7 after the war was near-chaos.

Steea'ing

aIlTthing tbl'ough sucb a morass in continual flux required
incredible dexterity"
one dizzy.

~~e

A

sial)le narration of the facts makes

mo.t intricate. and at the same time most

significant, .aneuvering was that eaployed in the ratification
of the Locarno 'freaty whioh had as an add.ed effect Germany's
entry into the League. ll5 This dual nature constituted both
a help and a hindrance in this regard.

Hindenburg. then

pre.ident, still vitally important to the decision-making proce.8 t was unalterable opposecl to German membership in tile
Leaguo.

ae was, bowever, favorably disposed to the Locarno
1I3Gatzke, gR. cit., 115.
114
ll5Turner,
ci1., p. 263.

•

••

•

61

Pact, largely won over through the efforts of Hans Luther,
Chancellor ot Germany.

Stresetlaon·s diplomacy had to be exer-

cised with the same skill in the bandling of the factions
within Germany, and the

.ulti~le

interests on the foreign scene.

In large measure, this meant playing one oft against the other.
To French Foreign Minister Briand, for example, be insisted

that he must have certain concessions to placate the German
National Pt)oples Part,. (DNVP).116
parties he argues that Gernu.lJ'l1

IIU8t

To the recalcitrant splinter
agree to various proposals

in order to win the trust of France and so. by acceptance into
the League, reap benetits in every quarter.

To indicate the

broad compass ot strese.ann'. thought. it is 1a"ortant to note
that be viewed the responsibilities, and at the same time the

opportunities, 0,1 tbe League in the econollic sphere very
seriously. II?
faotor in

To wbat degree this too constituted a lIotivating

Stre8e.t~·.

drive tor German

League can not be lIeuured.

.~mber8hlp

in the

Most important. however, was the

mor6 basic question ot G.....aay·s place in the sun.
respect that would naturally accrue to the boldeA" of

Beyond the
III

peraaaeat

seat in the League Caune!l was the tact that Germany could best

look atter ber own interests trom within one of the deliberative
bodi •• that concerned itself with questions that lIust afleet

IIft 1bid •• p. ~12.
117zimmern.

Opt

eil •• p. 363.
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her well-being.

As a permaDent mail"e,' of tbe League Council

sbe would. enjoy a veto power with ree;"u'd to any League busineaa
that affected

vital interests.

~lGr

In the vrocess of drawin.g

up the Covenant of tbe League, certain pl'eSUPllositiona bad
profoun~

elfects upon its operation as well as on its theoritl-

cal foundations.

One such premise was the concept of universa-

lity of Dlcm!>ersbip.118

This l8~cmt that the founders of the

League felt tbat relations among nations could ba better controlled if the nations "ere witbin rather than outside the
organization.
tice.

Uniortunatel,-,tbeory was not supported by prac-

The question of sanctiuns against members was less

complicated.

Tile relationship between the lIe.ber nations ot

the League could be specifically defined.
difficult to

n~,otlate

But it is much more

terms with a party when the very lrame-

. work of the negotiations must first be deter.ined upon, and
t'lere is no casual way to initiate talks.

'fhis remained the

common belief in spite of the widespread skepticism with regard

to the efficacy

or

the League machinery tor settliug dislJutea.

Thus most at the members of the League were anxious for GermaDT
to join the League, including her archenemy, France.

The

British, who as indicated above, conceived the League as an
institutionalization of the balance of power, considered that

IIa801z,

ORe

ci~.
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that balance was best achieved by having Germany a aeaber, and
furthermore a permanent member, of the Council.
an integral part of Europe.

Germany was

She was, of necessity, a part of

the mainstream that was generating a modern international world
"characterized by general eonventions of wide scope but uncertain duration. nl19 The League created a great "atreaa of
perpetual international activity:"120

After signing the Treaty

of Versailles, Geraany was not kindly disposed toward the
League.

Ber relationship with that organization was "very

queer and awkward."

According to Walter S18ons, Chief Justice

of the Supre.. r'ederal Court of Genuy I
Sbe had been forced to sign the) OQveaant but
was not allowed to beco.e a meaber; she had
all the obligations but none of the rights
of aembership. This mark of utter disdain
shown by a society of twenty-se~~n Datioaa
against a people they had 1nvit~d to sign a
peace treaty embittered the Germans, the
great majority of who. were, atter the War,
quite wililng to take a heavy load on their
shoulders in order to restore good will beI21
tween theaselves and their toraer en.aiea.
It must be rellellbered. however, that tbis was not a situation
involving equals--it concerned vietors and vanquished.

As

to

the Idea that Germany was forced to sign the Vera.ill.a Treaty.
that i& quite true.

So recalcitrant were they in that relard

1105i.ons, Inter_etlon.l Law since Grotius, p. 131
120Ibld ., p. 131.
121Ibid •

that it was teared that alter live brutalizing years 01 lighting, the allied would once more bave to resort to arms to make
Germany sign the document. 122 As to tbe allegation that she
was burdened with obligations without concurring rights, tbe
tact is that the obligations were a part of the Treaty of whicb
the League was also a part.

It was under tbe Treaty, not the

Covenant, that tbe obligations occurred.

It was no surprise

to anyone that the League proved unequal to the task ot resolving the political probl •• s ot the world.

On tbe other

hand. it didprove amazingly successtul in its evolution as an
administrative entity.

It carried torward the practice ot

general technical conterences relating to problems ot commerce,
health, labor, and trat.tic, and especially econollic matters.
The tact that tbe League was weak poli ticall.,. and strong
ecbnoaically 1s precisely wbat attracted Germany wbo never
tully accepted its political role, but was desperately interested in economic development.

Against tbis approacb. Briand

bad managed to forge a vision which reconciled very broad international issues witb national French interests.

It was through

his collaboration with stresemann that German membership was
ettected. 123

122

When stresemann used party tactions as a lever

.' ..... .

8yck. 221:CI:.tt,. t Vol. It p. 102.

l23For his part, Briand was awarded the Nobel peace
Prize, in 1926, the year Germany became a member ot the League.

I ,
!
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to gain French concessions, Briand, in his turn, held up the
intransigence

or

Poincare

88

a countermeasure.

On the whole,

the attitude of the French leaders toward Ge'-Man entrance into
the lAngue was tar better than one might have supposed on the
part of the chie! sufferer under the German military onslaught.
It is true that the French were largely responsible for keeping
Germany out of the League directly after the war. 124 It was
France which was the most insistent instigator of the reparations terms which were construed as disguised vengeance.
her belief in the mode of operation of the League

~nd

Yet

the nature

of the relationships established thereby was closer to the idea
of the lounders than that of her sister states.

One of the

great German co.mentators, Foerster, felt thot bis country
would oD.ly learn bow to behave in the Modern international world
by

accepting the guilt clause that proved

80

obnoxious to them,

so necessary to the French t and so eontroversi.al to all
nattons. 12S Penance must be done if Germany were to assnme her
rightful place

U1I1olg

the major nations of the earth.

Untortunate-

ly, n collective conscience is not made stronger by the numher

124Eyck , oe: cit., Vol I, p. 112.
12.Sprof••sor·Friedricb \\ilhel. Foerster was editor ot
the pacifist mngazine, "D1e Menscheit- in Wieshaden. He was
tbe butt of an attack by Str•••• ann who vi.wed his complaints
of secret German rearmament as injurious to Germ~my's interests.
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of individual. involved.

The idea

~hat

harsh terms ot peace

would teacb Ger.any that she had sinned against her tellow
states and so torce her to mend ber ways seems to go beyond

human experience.

An

analogy can be drawn between national

and individual conscience, but the eomparison remains an
analogy, it do•• not become an identity.

It might be possible

for an individual to go through painful self-analysis and, in
the process ot revelatioo, experience catharsis.
not go quite that tar.

A nation can

It would have taken the most funda-

••ntal and universal understanding on the part of the German
people to accowplish such a change ot character.

This they

could not do tor .everal reasons.
Given the historical setting of Europe in the early
twentieth century, no state could have survived which was
given to basic sell_doubt. l26 Aftar the unprecedented catastrophe ot World WarI, tbose nations Most sorely affected lived
on

by

p9wer ot will alone.

limi ted.

All power of whatever variety is

The amount of power that can be exercised over

(Ul

area is inversely proportionate to the extent of the area.
Germany could not exercise the mania that made her an ,outlaw 1n
the war and still preserve her soeio-eennomic viability.

To

discard her phi.losophy lvould have been tantamount to giving up
her nationhood.

When Foerster cried out in alarm over the
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dangers inherent in German I>bilosophy be could not have known

wbat he presaged. 127

In his darkest thoughts be could not have

imagined the facts ot World War II.

It was only alter that

second holocaust that scholars returned to the philosophy of
which Foerster spoke, to discover in more detailed and orderly
fashion, what he was talking about.
In crisis situations it is

axiomatic that tne behavior

or individuals and states alike reverts to primordial responses. 128 In the tace or present danger, the act or reactioD
of self-preservation is not experimental.

It is experiential.

&ven when the situation itself is the result of, or in the
context of, an experiment, tinal resort will be to learned
responses.

One may examine briefly the Bolshevik Revolution

whicb was, in many ways, a wholly new experiment.

When the

revolution was threatened from within, tbe machinery of the
old Taarist state was employed to sustain it.

tVhen it was

threatened j'rom \yitbout by annihilation at the hands of the
German forces, the atheistic Communists i.plored the Church to
exhort its members to fight for God and country.

It was no

longer "Fight tor tbe party," but "Fight tor Holy Mother
Itussia."
I2'Erich Eycl(t writing in 1956 said, "Today who can
still accuse Foerster of baving painted too black a picture or
of havint; eX8l;gerated?" Eyck, 0p. c~~., Vol. II, p. 132.

128~eber, ~P. cit.

~

.
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This same period witnessed the Socialists making great
strides in all the countries of Europe. 129 Several legislatures had a considerable representation of Socialists, and in
France, the premiership was held by a man who <!esignated himself a socialists.

Socialist ideology was at a peak, and

recruitment among the workers grew 3pace.

A sign1.ficant tenet

of this theory was an Avowed love tor peace.

It the countries

of Europe declared war, the socialists ..,ould declare i)eace by
refusing to fight in the armies or even to work to sustain
the war effort.

In the end, the first note of martial music

banished every other tune trom the heads ot these international '

stalwarts. 130
ticlp~tcd

Instead of tbe generals bowing betore the an-

general strike of the workers, the workers disposed

themselves to obey the generals.
with the

The real had not kept pace

~deal.

The League of Nations as envisioned before the war
bad as one of its characteristics the insintence upon universality of membership.

It was, however, the old Jdea of member-

ship restrictnd to civilized nations 1,.,ith Eurorte as the center
of gravity.

Even after the outbreaJ{ of hostili tics, members

of both sides of the conflict worked on the basis of

1~9Unrvey

Goldberg.

The Life of Jean

University of Wisconsin Press. 196~', p.
130Tuchman,

~.

c~t ••

p. 462.

485.

Ja"u~es.

(WadisoBa

69
universality, or at least titeir thoughts includvd the membership of defeated nations. 13l While the concept of tne League
was fast growing from an ivory-towered dream to a factor of
real

I~olitics,

there was still an admixture of idealism, of

expected behavior, of theory which was yet too advanced for the
real world, a world which included "back-room" politicians;
which included, on the parts of

~Aany p~rticipants

from the more

The con-

democratic nations, accountability to constituents.

stituents were not accounted for in earlier discussion of the
League.

The question then was moot; there was no need to go

beyond assuII1>tions.

But at the moment of truth, t.h.il\gs do not

always fall into place as it was presumed they would. Little
rougb edges suddenly can stop the entire process.h'hat could

not be accounted for in theory suddenly became vital.

What

was ignored because it could not be measured or could not be
predicted wi ttl accuracy at once const:i tuted an insurmountable
obstacle.
So it is with the idealist, the great humanitarian wito
loves mankind but hates his neighbors.

So even the ancient

hatred of JI'rench for German became tho ruling lactor in the
exclusion of Germany from League membership.
to suppose that if Itnly

di~]

It is possible

not behave as usual and cbange .

sides in mid-course she would have enjoyed a bettor

131Eyck ,

this tlUestion.

ch~mce

of

op_ cit., p. 112. Jackh, op_ cit also discusses
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being accepted in the League even though sbe ended the war on
the wrong side as a defel1ted nation.
other significant ditferanCtHJ.
Italy.

To be sure, there were

No olle particularly feared

She did not bave the potential for world

or

con(~est

domination, even though her attack on Ethiopia was allowed to
pass

unchecked by the members of tlle League when tha,t body

voted sanctions some years later.
There is more to the failure of the United states
finally to join the League than tbat President
poor political judgment in not

bringin~;

~ilson

used

with him to the ,)ro-

eeedings members of the Senate who must approve treaties made
by the chief executive, and representatives from the opposing
political party who must play a part in so dramatic a step as
United states involvameatln the fabric of European and world
political affairs.

ot the Continent.

Americans still nurtured grave suspicions
The words of George Washington abjuring

involvement in toreign affairs are engraved a.s a inl;radicable
part of their personality and character.
one German historian that:

It is the view ot

nTheEuropeans did in tact concede

the League of Nations to the Presiuent as a will......

13')

...

In-

deed. the continental mentality more and more determined the
actual operE.l.tion of the League. 133
n h'
132ve
10. op.

't•• ,
Cl.

133Ib1d •• p. 122.

p. 121
.•
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Tbus when tbe final moment arrived, the reaotion was
irrational, based upon response. that could not be .easured
and bence were not weighted properly in the assessment ot the
League founders.

When imponderables do exist. tbere is always

the tendency to give thea too much or too little account wben
reckoning a course ot action.

The probl.. is similar to

deteraining wbicb tacet of man's nature governs his existence.
It one subscribe. to the notion that he is a rational creature,
one must predicate rationality .s the decisive tactor in determining his course ot action.

It is very unpleasant tor the

idealist to contemplate overlong the irrational side ot aants
behavior.
Final determination of the governing principles at

I

iI
!

me.bership in an international organization seems as yet no
.ore susceptible to concrete resolution than is the question

ot admitting a specific State.

Tbe problem is epitomized in

the case ot Geraanyts ad.ission to the League.
In a paper on the League delivered betore the Grotius
Society in 1917, F. N. Keen stated:

"The inclusion of any

states that are regarded as likely disturbers ot the peace
is particularly desirable, for they will be more easily controlled if they are ins1de, than it they are outside the
League.· 134 Across the Atlantic nearly one year later Williaa

,

Ii
lSiGrotiu8 Society proceedin6s, Vol. II, 1917, p. 131.

I
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Howard Taft addressed the convention of the League to Enforce
Peace at .Madison, Wisconsin.

On the question of whether

Germany should be let into the League. he asserted:

"That

depends upon whether Germany lIake. berself fit tor tbe
League.,,135

She lIuat show by her actions that she has learned

the lessons "whicb the war should teach her."

Taft did not

elaborate at the ti.e on how Geraany was to demonstrate her
tltnes. for membership, but France was later to use this
approacb and be very specific about what was to be deemed
sufficient proo.! for redeRlption.
Pre.ident Woodrow Wilson, wbo was personally so lIuch
responsible for the League, had in .ind a homogeneous League
ot d.mocratic nations.

In a speech delivered at Oakland.

California, in SepteRlber of 1919, Wilson said:

"You read in

the newspapers that there are intrigues going on In Germany
tor the restoration of something like the old lovernment •••
very ..ell, it that sbould be accomplished, Germany is tor-ever
excluded tro. the League of Nations.

It is not our business

to say to the German people wbat sort of government they shall
have ••• but It is our business to say whom we will keep company
with."
135wi11iam Howard Taft. ~. Oblig.tlons ot Victor,'
an address delivered at the conveD:lon 01 t6e League to fn orce
Peace at Madison, ~isconsin, under the auspices of the University ot W1800nsin, November 9, 1918.
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Neither the Americans nor the British realized the
absolute necessity of. getting away from the sovereign state. 136
In this sense one might speak of an Anglo-American conception
of the League which derived from the fact that England. as
well as the United States, had in a very real sense been outside most wars and troubles. 137 England had played the policy
of the balance ot power.

Thus sbe wanted a "round table" where

diplomats could exhibit the results of their works.

Th. French,

according to the position espoused by Leon 8ourceois138 who
laid such stress on Article Nine of the Covenant, did see the
necessity of evolving a society capable of preserving international law and order, with provision for peaceful change,
There anst be an authority which is in so•• way.$upranational.
This conc.pt in no way ailitated against the French taking an
approach toward Germany tbat would insure here exclusion froa
the original ae.bership 1n the League and delay her entry
tragically long.

l~IThe tera "absolute necessity" ubvisouly does not
stand as a prerequisite for survival, but rather for the insured success of a meaningful and Viable international organization.
l37Waliers, op, cit •• p. 31.
138Leon Bourgeois was President of the Council of Siate
·of France. and served as t.he first president of the League of
Council.,

IY. THE ENTRANCE OF GERMANY INTO

THE LEAtKJE

In 1918 at the Reich.tag a debate was held regarding
the League ot Nations.

Friedrich Naumann protested:

It puzzles many and myself that in the thinking regarding the League, as Wilson puts it to
us, everything is already prepared in "einzelnen."
We must look upon it as the foreaost problem in
the world ••• But to Germans it is no strange
work. Where did the idea of "Wenscbenheitsentwicklung" stem from? Not originally trom
Lloyd George and Wilson ••• it is Much older and
deeper, tor example in the work at Lessing:
"Erziebung des Menschengeschlechts", or Kanta
"Yom ewigen Frieden" ••• and a wbole brilliant
row of great thinkers up to Hegel. It was the
thought in whicb the generation of our grandfathers was realized. We must sit again at the
feet of our ancesters and learn from the spring
of wisdom how we can £,ow .ell after tbis unbelievable upheaval. 1 3
The magazine "Die Hilfe" proclaimed:

It the German people were

COllvinced of the efficacy of the League, Wilson would have no
finer partners.

Atter

much war we wish more than any other
nation for demilitarization. 140
80

There is, according to German historians, an overwhelming history of German t.hought in the direction ot an

139Jickh , op. cit •• p. 9.

_.,

140Ibid

pp. 11-12.
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~ranslation by

uuthor.
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organization tor ensuring the peace.
m08t mystical thinkers of

Ge~any,

It is a product of the

her greatest philosophers.

The question which logically tollows is whether or not this
spirit was alive during the Great War.
Ret~rence

may be made in this regard to many contem-

porary articles which present impressive evidence that such
spirit was not only alive but had moved into the realm ot the
political. 141 The specialist in international law, Walter
Schueking, wrote powertully tor such an idea in "Der Welttriedensbund," 1916, and "Der Bund der Volker," 191?

He even

.uggested, in 1915, to Betbaann-Hollweg's .eeretary of state
Zimmeraann that the adainistration ought to officially
acknowledge ge "Volkererbundgedanken."

Tbe i".diate retort

was characteristic tor the regime wherein the political
weakness contrasted with the intluence of the military:

"Yes,

protessor, but if we were to do that, wbat would our generals
. and naval officers say to U.?"
This factor is not to be forgotten:

the government

even before the war, but .specially during it, was in practice
subordinate to the military.

So deeply, however, was the

Id •• of the League ingrained in the Ger.an mind. even the
height ot war did not remove it.

On the twenty-second of May

1916, Be thaann-Hollweg, during an interview, joined Sir Edward

141JabresversammluDl de. neutscben Werkbundes. 14
Juni, 1916.
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Grey in a statement supporting a aituation "in which tree and
equal nations reduced their araaments and settled their ditterence. through arbitration instead of war."

Later on t in

November ot that year, Betn.ann-Hollweg saids

"Germany is

prepared at any time to join a League ••• ,,142
The pre.s at the tiae ,_ve a.e.ingly unitied assent.
Hans Uelbruck wrote in the "Preuiaischen Jabrbuchern:"
"Pacitis.· is no longe.. a move.ent ot ideals and dre8lls t but a
broadly based need of peoples and states, and to embrace
pacitis. is truly political reality."
Ernst Jackh expressed the conviction that a ne. order
waa to be .stablished no matter wbo was the victor in the war!43
He *ad. this assertion a tull six month. bet ore a like sentiment was enunciated by Woodrow Wilson.
All tbe political parties in Geraany shared this view
except the Conservatives.

The Cabinet was agreed upon entrance

into the League and repeated its willingness to ratify such a
move as late as the 24th of April, 1919.
before Venaailles.

That wast of course,

FinallYt in V.rsaille. itaelf there was an

exchange of notes between the Gera&l peace delegation and

14~It sbould be kept in mind that these sentiments
were being expressed by the regime, and were not shared by the
military, nor by aembers from opposition parties. They were
then t the expression of a minority.
143JAckh-Scbwarz,

Ope

ciS.
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Georges Clemenceau.

The result was negative.

By the end ot January 1921, at the international

Conference in Paris, a tormal objection against the acceptance
to membership of Germany was announced.

Tbe League was es-

tablished not only without the German nation, "but even against
the German nation,"

Germany was to be made to feel "as an

outlaw, as morally depraved."144
The actuality was that the League was not a new order
but an instrument of maintaining the difference between victor
and vanquished,

Arnold J. Tppbbee, noted historian, in one ot

a series ot discussions held at Chathaa 80use, London, main·tained that,
As the Germans see it, and they see it more
clearly though;, not necessarily more truly,
the victors imposed peace on their deteated
enemies, and, in order to maintain the settlement decided to rope in ,outsiders. The League
is a l 80, as the Germans see it, an atte.pt to
circumvent Nature; and its "unnaturalness" is
a still more serioua tlaw than its "injustice"
since the l!lsof Nature is not fixity but
mutability.
H. G. Wells said in the same vein:

"The League ot Nations i.

an organization which was imposed on them (Germany) to keep
them down by torce to the advantage ot the victor."

In his

fi4Arnold J. Toynbee. participating in discussions at
the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House,
London, 1936.

,
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book:

"Aaerican Diplomacy," G. F. Keonan concluded that" •••

the progress ot World War I did not bring reasonableness, or
bumility, or the spirit of compromise to the warring peoples:146
In spite ot all, the allied nations gradually grew out

ot their war psychosis ot the traditional enemy, slowly to a
rational political position.
heart ot Europe.

For Germany is the geographical

Europe can no live without its heart, nnt

can Germany live without its body.

The way ot Germany into the

League was long, and the League itselt a quite difterent entity
tbat that envisioned by the various League of Nations societies
around the world.

Europe stood on the threshold of a new age,

but it stepped back, not forward.

Wby had the hoped-for birth

of a new world order ended in aiscarriage?
The defeat whicb came to the German sra'.s and their
allies was as sudden as it was catastrophic.

The German people

in general believed almost to the last that thFly were going to
emerge victorius. The "Memoirs" of General Erich Ludendorft14?
indicate that on the eigh1b of August 1918, it burst upon his
consciousness that the morale of the army was giving way.

By

the end ot that month he informed the Chancellor that tbere must
be no delay in seeking for peace.

In the two montbs followlng,

lilleonen, oe. cit., p. 56.
147Erlcb Ladendortt, Ueinelrie,serlnnerun,en, 1914-191§,
Berlin, 1919.
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the people became aware ot their plight and it became apparent
that tbey were hard against the face of unconditional surrender.
The political situation was in chaos. and the stabilizing force
oftbe military dissipated into confusion.

Conditions in

Germany were far worse in all respects than anything experienced
by the Allies.

Tbe so called "turnip winter" of 1916-1917 had

exacted a beavy toll of forbearance, and all the tre.endous
suffering and endless endurance of the people of tbat nation
bad availed tbea naught.
The German Eapire of the half-century culminating in
World War I was powerful to be sure.

But it would have to be

described as an autocracy, and so. in the end, vulnerable. tor
the roots of such systems do not go deeply into tbe soil.
History teaches that sucb forms of government are the moat
likely to be overthrown by revolution.

Allegiance tbere may

be, but it is to tbe rulers, not the government.
rulers sbould lose their coercive powers

~

If those

charismatic attrac-

tions, the bonds of obedience are seyered and with tbem the
confidence and support of the people.
are practiced in obedience.

The Germans particularly

But as in all things there are

. limits, and wben the •• have been exceeded tbe inevitable result
i. revolution.

80\it ... in Germany_

The old regime had

excited great entbusiasm and pride among the vast majority of
its citizens.

Yet no one raised a band or gun to stay the
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sweeping away of the government or its dynastic •••bers.

What

saved the nation froM untold additional violence and bloodsbed
was the Socialist Party which was well organized, moderate,
and strong.

There was also at work the cbaracter of tbe people

themselves whicb was so given to orderly conduct of affairs.
For example, after the turn of tbe century, tbe various socialist parties of Europe met in Germany to discuss the overall
party

progr~.

~onl

the questions to be resolved was that of

the status of the party and its individual members regarding
peace, and More particularly, tbe conduct of war.

Socialist

theory rejeots war as a .eans of .ettling disputes bet.een
nations.

Further.ore, there were SOMe socialists wbo believed

that war at this time would hasten ihe deMise of Capitalism.
They were doubly interested in seeing that the working-class
people did not support the war effort in any way_

The question

was how to express this as internat10nal socialist policy.

As

far as the German party was concerned, tbey would not call a
general strike to express their oppOSition to the war, nor
would they refuse to fight.
German socialists put it:

As one of the leaders of the
The Germans were far too accustomed

to obedience and an orderly civil life to engage in wholesale
anarchy_

They were also too strongly imbued with the BotioB

01 V.terlaod not to respond to a call to arms.

course. a very general statement.

Thi. is, of

The exceptions were numerous
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and iMporiani.

Nonetheless, ibe Socialists bad already iaken

office in ihe Coalition Cabinei under Prince Max of Baden, and
so were in straiegic positions io take control wben order was
moai sorely needed.

The pariy managed t ai a very critical

period, to suppress the dangerously anarcbisiic Spariacists,
and to provide inatead for general elections with universal
trancbise a scani iwo aontbs atier the revolution. l48
Prince Max von Baden had banded ihe presidency over
to Friedrich Ebert in 1919 who direcied Hugo Preuss, a Berlin
protessor, to draw up an outline for a Consiituiion for tbe
Republic.

Considerable work had been done before the new

Parl1aaent .et at Weimar, and this formed ihe basis for committee discussion.

The

~utline

received extensive alteration

before being accepted in 1919.

One of the chief factors eli8i-

nated was a .cbeae for dividing tke influence of Prussia.

The

re.ult, noneiheles., was tbe creaiion of a truly democratio
doeuaent.

Each ••aber state Must be republican in for., and

ulii.Qie power r •• ide. In the people.

Further, states' rights

were limited and the Federation more clo.ely knit than under
the Constitution of Blsmarck.
Procedures for i.ple.enting the de.ocratic principle
are of espeCial note.

Universal Buffrage was extended to 8ucb

148yax von Baden.
Stuttgart, 1920.

Erinn.runsen und Dokua.nte,

82

degree as to eomprise more than fifty per cent of the population.

The president was popularly elected, but had only limited

powers.

Electoral districts were determined geographically

without regard for state boundaries.

An

added novelty, the

Reichsliste. produced a situation in wbich the individual candidate was virtually e1iJainated to the aggrandizement of the
strongest and best organized Parties.

The implications of this

were to be felt lIuch later in the history of the Weimar Republic.
In the course ot framing the Constitution the German
people retrieved a measure of hope for the future of the
But at that moment the teras of the Treaty of
Versailles were announced. 149 The Weimar Assembly was split
Republic~

asunder.

There were tbose among the allies who teared that

hostilities would have to be renewed betore Germany would
accept the terms ot settlement.

Tbe treaty was accepted largely

through the auspices ot Matthias Erzberger. perhaps the most
influential man in the government at the time. 150 The result,
however, was the rise ot the "extrelle Right.

Resentment

~'

against the treaty was tocused upon the Socialists who were so
largely responsible for its acceptance.

The m08t bitter re-

action to til" treaty wa.s provoked by the clause therein whicb
14§uatthiaa Erzberger. Der V~lkerbunda der We, zom
Welt Frieden, Berlin. 1918.
150Yattbiaa Erzberger, Erlenbniss i. Weltkriel. Stutt-

,
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held thut the entire responsibility for the outbreak of the war
was placed on the shoulders of Germany and her allies.
the Schuldfrage has perdured even to this day.

Indeed,

Included, for

good or ill, as part and parcel or tbe Treaty of Versailles
was the Covenant of the League at Nations.

That a world organi-

zation ot sovereign and equal states should be bound up with a
treaty forcing terms of peace and reparations upon de.reated
nations must certainly be considered unfortunate.

It was, in

the mind of its foremost proponen"t. President Wilson, a political necessity.
terms ot peace,

In his view, if it were not made a part of the
once the peace was settled it might never

co.e into existence.

Such might well be the case.

But in

making it a facet of the peace settlement it became identified
as a instrument of the victors in subduing the vanquished.
Though virtually all the world was at one time or another represented within it. assembly, it retained the aura or a
political alliance.

First the Allied powers versus the Axi.

nations, then the Democratic states versus the Bolsheviks, then
again the Allied nations versus the Axis powers.

It is against

thisconcept that German progress toward the League is to be
studied.

'rh. German Chancellor, Bethaa8lUl-Hollweg, was profundl,.
impressed by Sir

~dward

Grey's enunciation of the desirability

or an association of nations.

Ue asserted that Germany would
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not only join sucb a body, but take an active lead in it.

In

tbe midst of tbe war, before there was any inkling of the impending German defeat, Matthias Erzberger began working on
what was to be tbe first draft of a plan for a League of Nations
offered by any of the nations involved in tbe conflict. 15l
His scheme was an elaborate one whicb went beyond the Covenant
in calling for the compulsory arbitration of all disputes.

It

must be said that this was a favorite theme of British thinkers,
who. for the most part. had little use for tbe idea of maintaining peace through organization.

But as yet they had not

produced any detailed plans of any sort.

All parties did

finally get about the work of drafting serious plans, but the
main author of the scheme as ultimately prevailed was President
Wilson.

Tbis tact of itself provoked antagonism on the German

side for they felt Wilson bad forsaken them in the Peace
Treaty.

There remained, of course, in addition to this, the

overbearing weight of the victorious powers.

Countering this

was the strong inclination of the parties on tbe Left and
Center to join with this new institution in building a peaceful
and democratic world. 152 There is little doubt tbat if Germany
had been invited into the League at the tim. of its tormation,
she would certainly bave accepted.

151Eyck, op.

Such was tbe avowed wish

cit., Vol. I. p. 12.

152JAckb , 0p. cit.
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of the delegations froID England and the United states.

In tile

end, French intransigence prevailed, and tho course of history
changed. 153
From his position as party leader, stresemann used his
strength in that capacity to support his foreign policy.

His

operations in foreign affairs, for example, the successful
conclusion he wrought out of the Ruhr-reparations dispute,
seemed too subtle to be appreciated by the electorate.

But

stresellann was sure in tbe eud that bis accollplishalents would
show themselves on the domestic scene.

»ith this in mind he

intended to exploit bis achievements abroad to solidify his
position at bome.

The elections of December 1924, confirmed

Stresellsnn in the path of his own slogan "priaacy of loreign
policy."

Heretofore he had concentrated equally on the domes-

tic implications of bis foreign policy and approached the two
areas coordinately.

After the elections the president ot

Germany, Ebert, asked him to lona a government.

This be agreed

to do with the condition that if he did not succeed in building
a coalition cabinet (wbich •• ant bringing in the Nationalists)
be would refuse the chancellorship.

The Centre balked at a

rightist coalitiou, and a crisis resulted which was resolved by
the naming of Hans Luther, then Minister of Finance, as the
new chancellor.
in den

stresemann's role as king-maker in this

153Uerbert Kraus.
Tubin

V~lkerbund

Zur Frase des Eintritte Deutsch1ands
•

enI9~S.
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instance was evident to all observers.

He bad achieved a

special position among the rulers of the Weimar Republic.

No

workable government could be formed without the Deutsche
Volkspartei of which Stresemann was chairman.

Finally, hi.

succesa in foreign affaira made him one ot the most important
and indispensable men in Germany both as regards their domestic
and foreign policy.

The nature ot the Versailles Treaty pro-

foundly affected the internal situation in Germany_
With the passage of time, the etfects of the Peace
Treaty were made manifest in both the political and economic
realm..

They were deleterious in the extreme, destroying vir-

tually all Germansentiaent toward the League.

This was due

largely to action taken by the League other than the terms of
peace.

Chief 880nl these were:

the paritlon of Upper Silesia,

the administration of the Saar, and the occupation ot the
Ruhr. lS4
The Upper Silesian problem tell to the League simply
because the Allie. themselves were unable to reach any compromise.

Considering the complexity of the situation, the

added involvement ot a plebiscite, the League did a creditable
job in resolving wbat was set before it.

The German anger

grew out of the partition itself. Dot the incidentals ot its

154Eyck•

op. cit., pp. 155. 180. 250.
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being executed.

The German ire, untortunately, knew no distinc-

tion.
The Saar situation was particularly pernicious because
it represented French imperialism, a fact which would not be
disguised.

That the French attempted to hide behind tne League

only made things worse.

What was nominally entrusted to the

administration of the League of Nations became a pawn for
France to play with.
Beliet in the League as an international body received
the coup de grace when France occupied the Ruhr and that
question was never even officially discussed by the League.
The British made so.e small attempt to have it recognized, but
were put down at once by the veto ot the French representatives.
Thus it developed that when an official invitation was
sent to Berlin in the summer of 1922'to apply for membership,
Germany declined.

Such was the turnabout that she now insisted

that certain of ber conditions be met before she would enter
the League.

She would not com. in as merely one of the members

of the Assembly.

She must bave her rightful place along with

the Great Powers who were the permanent members 01 tbe Council.
Actually, there were very rew who thought that this should not
be the case.

It was only unseemly that Germany should so forth-

rightly de_and it.

Many Germans wished to bold out till France

ended ber occupation of the KUhr, which was considered in viola-
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entire treaty be revised.

But there remained in Germany strong

currents in favor ot bel" as.uming a place witbin the

Leu~ue

of

Among these was the influence ot German pacifism wbo••

Nations.

• ajor spoke ..en were leaders ot bigb repute.

The great juriats

01 the day also exerted themselv•• In bebalf oC

~eague

m•• ber-

i\nd countering tbe agit-atlon of tbe rightists was the

ship.

growing rel}rv.entation

or

internationalist. In the universiti •••

. No aatter what the loree. at play .ero within Ger.any, there
.as no hOI)e for her joining the League, and previous little
hope tor

~urope

until tbe attitude and policy ot France could

be cbanged.
J.S. Bu •• tt, .Prot••• or 01 American Hlatory, wrote.

The student of United State. history ••11 knows
bow d.eply strike tbe roots of popular r •• entment when the penalties of war are enforced by
persistent .interterence with the eivil lire ot
the vanquished. The i'ss •• bly of the League of
Nations bad not read our history de.llly on that
point, or it they had read it, they did not dar.
apply its l •• sona. Aa it I1J"oved, europe had to
cliab up tbe hill ot r ••!Htaent and the. down
again on the otber slde. 3
The i.portance of GenftaQJ's place amon, the nations ot

the world can not be over.stl.ated.

Ind•• d, this is true ot

every natioD, but p&rticul<1:lrly those in which feelings ot
nationalism are waxing.

Whether one considers this a force for

lood or ill is of no cODse<luence.

.t,,.
I "

l!!JobD Spencer 8assett.

in .. otld pol&11os.
p. 104.

What .at tors 18 that 1t is

llli Le~ue of ~a~D8!

(Xew Yo.. :

a ·
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an undeniably powertul impelling factor in the behavior of
states both large and small.

G.raanr.

She

W88

Of no one was this more true ••an

not alone in conceiving that she po ••••••• a

rightful ••at in the iniernaiional body of the League.

The

business ot Europe and the world ought not be conducted without
Germany's coun.el.

It .eant more than prestige; it meant the

power to share in shaping the events of the world to which the
League would bear witness.

Perhaps most revealing of all re-

garding this point was the lansuage of the plebiscite taken in
1933 to determine the citizens' position

OR

German membership

in the League,
Th. German gov.rnment and the German people are
iherelore at one in the decision to withdraw
from the Disarmament Conference and the League
until this real eQuality is no longer withheld
from our people.~~6
More than ninety per cent of the voters went to the polls and
voted ·ye •• •

It must be readily granted that the case i. not

made that recognition as an equal was the ruling tactor in this
tateful decision.

There wa., by tbis time, no doubt anywhere

that Germany was in the process ot re-arming herself and had
no intention ot relinquishing a single bullet.

But that does

not detract from tbe basic desire tor acceptance.

As tor

armaments, that is one way to toree respect froa one. neighbors.
lSiMildred s. Wertheimer. "The Foreign Policy ot the
Third Reich," Foreign Policy Reports. X, No.2 (28 March 1934)
p. 15. Aa qnotea Iro. volflscher Biobacbter, 12 November 1933.
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The continuing fear of Germany on the part of France
coupled with the General tear of a Russian war led her to maintain a large army.

This she could ill afford.

It contributed

to a state ot apprehension and uncertainty which blocked the
establishment of tbe harmony and confidence in Europe so necessary to the progress of the League. France's excessive concern
tor tbe war reparations exacted upon Germany made it see. as
thougb ber entire policy in the League was bent in that direction.

The close association witb France with the other leading

.e.bers of that body could only reinforce the German notioD
tbat it was constituted for DO purpose other than binding ber
in economic servitude.
Tbat tbe reparations were unwise and unrealistic was
demonstrated by their cataclysmic ettect upon the German aation,
and so upon tbe whole ot Europe.

Freneb policy in the Saar

and Ruhrretleeted this and only made the situation worse.
state of aftairs were critical.

The

But against this background

serious efforts were being made to bring about stability in all
areas.
The First Asse.bly of the League appointed the Temporary Mixed Commission to report a plan of disara ..ent.

Out

of this evolved the Draft Treaty ot Mutual Guarantee ot 1922
which in turn gave rise to the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923.

Though

Dei~ber

of these was adopted, they
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served the purpose of clarifying ideas and providing a concrete
form for debate in the Assembly.

They were the stepping stones

tor the Geneva Protocol and the Locarno Treaty and Conventions.
The Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settle.ent of International
Disputes, though it too tailed of adoption, exerted a powertul
influence on the League, and ultimately the Pact of Locarno,
This last established the sorely needed political stability
in Europe so essential to German entranoe into the League.
Progress in this direction was aided by a liberalization

ot the foreign policies of France and England,

This came about

through political change in both these countries.

In 1924 the

Labor party with Ramsay MacDonald as Prime Minister took control of the British Parliaaent.

That same year, some tew

months later, Edouard Harriot, the Socialist leader ot a
Liberal coalition, came to power in France.

Tocether they

marshalled support tor the Dawes Commission, a plan for resolving the reparations question

alleviating the onus of
Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty, the war-guilt clause. 157
and

It remained tor Dr. Gustav Stresemann to tinish the complicated
task ot bringing Germany into the League.
The political situation in Germany was complex and
volatile.

The lett wing Socialists and Radicals held a liberal

position regarding toreign attairs. and stood internally for

.

IS'George Glasgow, From Dawes to Locarno.

Harper's, 1926.

New York,
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the nationalization of some industry_
supporters ot the Republic.

They were the staunchest

Opposite them stood the right

wing Nationalists who favored the restoration of the monarchy
and were conservatives domestically.

Between these extremes

were the pivotal parties of the Center.

They stood for the

Republic and so placed it on firm ground.

They were conser-

vative domestically and so kept the nation from socialism.

Most

important tor the League effort ot Stresemann, their foreign
policy attitude was liberal.

The Lett had its necessary

majority and strese.ann his support trom the Reichstag.
mandate, however. was tar trom solid.

His

His policies were de-

nounced tro. all sides depending upon the issue.

The skill

with which he played one taction against the other was nothing
it not superb. 1S8
So precarious was the political position of the government that the acceptance of the Locarno Treaty brought about
Its downfall.

A new government was formed and set about pre-

paring Germany's application for adminission into the League
of Nations.

The Nationalist party continued to object, but

their major points or contention were met by the French and
the strength of their position dissolved.

On the eighth of

February 1926, the Cabinet unanimously accepted str•• emann's
158Ferdinand Fridensburg.
Berlin, 1946.

Die WeiMarer ReRubl1k.
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draft of the note which was to be sent to the League applying
for admission.
Unfortunately, great difficulties were yet to be overcome before Germany could be accepted for membership.
problems bow lay on the other side.

The

The Covenant obliged mem-

bers to provide militarily for the Comllon defence against
enemies.

Germany had no army to speak of and thus could not

comply with this requirement. But this disability could be and
was overcome. 159 Of greater moment was the dispute regarding
the permanent seats in the Council.

Spain, out of pride, co-

veted a permanent seat in the Council and Brazil, as the
~arge.t

state in America, thought she deserved one.

FinallYt

Poland, with the support of France, announced her demand for a
permanent seat.
It was then disclosed that Great Britain stood in support of Spain's bid.

That such intrigue should infest the

League of Nations was an appalling shock to the world which had
so recently been infused with the spirit of Locarno.
member Council, as it was established,

and

The ten-

as it actually

operated, consisted ot four permanent members with three of
the non-permanent members, Spain, Belgina and Brazil, having
had what amounted to permanent place. tro. the beginning.
was the position of the interested nations that
IS'Walterst

oe.

cit., Vol. I., p. 281.

~~nly

Such

a vi tal
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change in the structure of the Council could resolve the impasse.

This entailed a considerable amount of political maneu-

vering which appeared at times like a game of musical cbairs
except that it was in earnest and the peace of the world was
at stake.

The way was made clear for Germany to enter the

League and as sum. one of five permanent seats on a Council
now expanded to fourteen a.mbers, niDe of whom would be
selected on a rotating basis.

But in accomplishing this, the

League lost two members, Spain and Brazil, both of which states
withdrew Irom the League in accordance with Article I of the
Covenant. It was not the happiest possible solution. 160
On the eight of September 1926, the seventh Assembly

passed by a unanimous vote Germany's application tor m.mbership in the League of Nations. Two days later it came time for
the Assembly to admit the German delegates.

Their credentials

were reported 1n order and Strese.ann, with two associaies,
made his entry to applause.

He

made a speech pledging the

loyalty of Germany,

It cannot be the purpose of the Divine world
order that men should direct their supreme
national energies against one another, thus ever
thrusting back the general progress of civi11zation ••• the cooperation of the peoples in the
League of Nations must and will lead to just
solutions for the moral questions which arise in
tbe conscience of the peoples. The most durable

160Bassett,

0e. cit.,

p. 326.
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foundation of peace is a policy inspired bY161
mutual respect between nation and nations.
On this occasion the French representative, Briand, gave his
most hopeful address before the Assembly:
Peace for Germany and for France, that means
that we have done with the long series of terrible and sanguinary conflicts which have stained
the pages of history. We have done with the
black veils of mourning for sufferings that can
never be appeased, done with war, done with
brutal and sanguinary methods of settling our
disputes_ True, differences between us still
exist, but henceforth it will be for the judge
to declare the law. Just as individual citizens
take their difficulties to be settled by a magistrate, so shall we bring ours to be settled
by pacific procedure. Away with rifles, machineguns, cannon I Clear the way for conciliation,
arbitration, peace. 162
Yet at this very lIollent, stresemann and his colleagues were
aware of what troubled times lay ahead.

The Germany for whicb

he spoke was that same one to whom the cult of the sword had
for centuries been a religion.

It still comprised the ir-

reconciliable Nationalists, and the irrepressible militarists
who lived only to the tunes of national glory.

Where those

discordant notes would lead could only be guessed at.
truth would reveal itself all too

800n.

The

163

On October 23, 1933. Germany announced her withdrawal
froll the League of Nations, and on March 16, 1935. tormally

i6I
llWl•

t

p. 329.

l62 lbid ., p. 329.
l63 Kohn , OPT cit-, pp. 290-297.

denounced the clauses
her disarmament.

or

the Treaty of Versailles concerning

The circle was complete.

, •

CONCWSION

At the very least. an international organization should
provide a torue for ongoing dialogue between nations.

This is

most true among states wbich are experiencing difficultie. in
their relationships.
conference table.

It is precisely tbey who need sucb a

Friendly nations which bave similar institu-

tions and aspirations find tbemselves with multiple channels
of coamunication.

Governments generally have been reluctant

to do barm to tbeir neighbors in the midst of formalized discussion with them.

When that is the intent, the first action

taken is to leave the table.
not to be allowed.

In the minds of many, this ought

The weight of public opinion grows ever

heavier, and one day will not be overborne.
Pope John XXIII, in his encyclical "Pace. in Terris"
wrote:
••• a11 human beings, as they take an ever more
active part in the public life of their own
political communities, are showing an increasing interest in the affairs of all pe()jlles t and
are becoming more consciously aware that they
are liviYi4members of a universal family of
mankinG.

164Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris, Part IV, p. 145.
97

98

No supranational authority can rightfully be the instrument of
one-sided interests •
••• the present system of organization and the
way its principle of authority operated on a
world basis no longer correspond to the objQi:tive
requirements of the universal coamon good. 165
This must apply as well to the League and the United
Nations.

Such is tbe interdependence of every nation in the

world that no single nation or concert of states can alford
to isolate itself from the world or impose isolation on any
otber state ao matter how inimical may be its political institutions.

165Ibi <!e, Part IV, p. 135.

APPENDIXES
Appendix A - Membership 1n League of Nations-Covenanta

1t

Artiele
parSfra&h i: Tbe original Member. of the League of
Nailons s att e t ose of tbe Signatories which are named in
the Annex to this Covenant and also such of those other states
named in the Annex as shall accede without reservation to this
Covenant. Such accession shall be affected by a Declaration
deposited into force of the Covenant, Notice thereof shall be
sent to all other Members of the League.
Article 1. P~flrapb 2: Any fully self-governing state,
DOmInIon or 0 ony not named in the Annex may become a Member
of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of
the Assembly, provided that it sball give effective guarantees
of its intellectual obligations, and shall aceept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its
military, naval and air foree. and armaaents.

Dee. 1920 - 5th Committee of Ass••bly charged with problem of
adaission appointed 3 subco. .ittees, 7 members each and prepared the following questions in respect of each applicant
wbich the Sub-eommittees were charged to investigate:
a) Was the (applicant's) application for admissions to the
League in order?
b) Was the Government applying for admission recognized de jure
or de facto and by which states?
c) Was the applicant a nation with a stable government and
settled frontiers? What .ere its size and its population?
d) .fas it fully self-governing?
e) What had been its conduct, including both aets and assurance
with regard to (1) its international obligations; (11) the
prescriptions of the League as to covenants?
99
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Appendix C - Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 16:
1. Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard
of its covenants under Articles 12, 13, 15, it shall ispo
facto be deemed to have committed any act of war against
all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake
immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade
or tinancial relations, the prohibition ot all intercourse
between their nationals and the nationals of the covenantbreaking state, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of
the covenant-whether a Me.ber of tbe League or not.
2. It shall be the duty of tbe Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned wbat effective
military, naval or air torce the Me.bers of the League shall
severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of tbe League.
3. Tbe Members of the League agree, further, that they will
mutually support one another in the financial and economic
measure whicb are taken under tbis Article, in order to
.inimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the
above measures, and that they will mutually support one
mlother in resisting any special measures aimed at one of
their nnaber by the covenant-breaking State, and that they
will take the necessary steps to afford passage through
their territory to the forees of any of the Members ot the
League which are cooperating to protect the covenants of
the League.
4. Any Member ot the League which has violated any covenant of
tbe League may be declared to be no longer a Me.ber of the
League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.
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